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14. ABSTRACT

This paper's goal is to examine service culture and determine where service friction is most likely to occur. The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the possibility that a senior military leader's own cultural bias, combined with a lack of understanding and appreciation of fellow sister-service culture, causes service friction that negatively influences team effectiveness, and therefore the skillful employment of the Joint Force. Cultural traits infused into the individual by the respective U.S. military departments could negatively influence inter-service collaboration and coordination, joint staff interactions, command decisions, and Joint Force employment effectiveness. The thesis methodology consists of a literature review on service culture and a review of two primary historical case studies to provide operational examples. The author identifies four primary service-culture friction points. The author recommends adjustments to joint professional military education and operational assignment processes to mitigate service culture friction in an effort to focus the joint force on better preparedness for future conflicts and stress the importance of a cohesive joint team.

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JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL

FORMING A BETTER JOINT TEAM:

UNDERSTANDING SERVICE CULTURE IMPACT ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SENIOR MILITARY LEADERS

by

Mark R. Wisher

Lieutenant Colonel, United States Air Force

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FORMING A BETTER JOINT TEAM:

UNDERSTANDING SERVICE CULTURE IMPACT ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SENIOR MILITARY LEADERS

by

Mark R. Wisher

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

This paper is entirely my own work except as documented in footnotes.

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ABSTRACT

While many authors have highlighted the unique attributes of each of the U.S. Armed Services, very few have provided insights into how the uniqueness of each service culture might cause friction between them. This paper's goal is to examine service culture and determine where *service friction* is most likely to occur.

The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the possibility that a senior military leader's own cultural bias, combined with a lack of understanding and appreciation of fellow sister-service culture, causes service friction that negatively influences team effectiveness, and therefore the skillful employment of the Joint Force. Under the context of service friction, this monograph will investigate the implications of a senior military leader's own service culture on his/her ability to employ military forces effectively in combat as a Joint Force. Cultural traits infused into the individual by the respective U.S. military departments (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines) could negatively influence inter-service collaboration and coordination, joint staff interactions, command decisions, and Joint Force employment effectiveness.

The thesis methodology will consist of a literature review to identify the existing and/or perceived service culture of the U.S. Army, Navy, Marines, and Air Force. The author highlights four primary service-culture friction points. The author provides a review of two historical case studies, examining how service culture influences inter-service interactions in a joint operational context. The author recommends adjustments to joint professional military education and operational assignment processes to mitigate service culture friction in an effort to focus the joint force on better preparedness for future conflicts and stressing the importance of a cohesive joint team.

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PREFACE

Strategy does not yield to the scientific method, and nor does the study of culture.

-- Colin S. Gray, *Out of the Wilderness*

The complex has been made simple; the great diversity of views within each of the services has been transformed into a monolithic voice speaking for the service. The purpose in these obvious distortions is not ridicule, but discernment--to bring that which has become so familiar as to be hidden from view back into focus in order to understand the past, present, and future behavior of the services.

-- Carl H. Builder, *The Masks of War*

The author is an U.S. Air Force fighter pilot, and therefore not immune from the same service culture influences and biases that are a part of this monograph's argument. Culture is indiscriminant; it influences thoughts, behaviors, actions, and interactions of all members of an organization. However, the author has attempted to mitigate biases during the research and analysis for this paper--the evidence stands on its own merit.

The study of inter-cultural impact between the U.S. military services is very much an exercise in art. The author will make every attempt to provide insights from historical case studies, but there are some inferences made to reach some conclusions--the audience must decide the validity.

The author's motivations are simple. Sun Tzu stressed the importance of knowing yourself and your enemy and you would win a hundred battles. This thesis is all about knowing ourselves, the U.S. military. Only through honest assessment and reflection of our Armed Services, will we truly know and understand the members of our joint fighting force.

The author's inferences, findings, or conclusions will undoubtedly offend some readers. Service members are an incredibly proud breed of character, and rightly so--the United States military is the most powerful and effective joint fighting force in the world. However, this monograph will highlight both positive and negative Service traits. These blemishes serve only to highlight the inter-service friction points of today, and those to consider for the future--for improvement and true mastery of the fighting force is not possible without addressing the challenges of our joint interactions.

Although some might say we have muddled through our joint past with "junior-varsity" inter-service de-confliction, our future must shift towards "varsity" integration. We will not achieve varsity-level execution without varsity-level integration. We will not achieve this level of joint force integration without first understanding our sister-services and their culture. However, a word of caution to the reader: the cultural traits and characterizations identified in this paper should not result in broad stereotypes of individual service members. Instead, the author's intent is to highlight the "center of mass" of the organizations' culture. Although this paper will synthesize broad classifications of organizational culture traits, there will obviously be individuals who are outliers with their own unique personalities, but still nonetheless influenced by the organizations' cultural traits.

Our distant future will certainly involve a fighting force that is significantly smaller than we have today, and the Nation will expect that joint force to fight and win. We must know ourselves, regardless of what "scabs" it might reveal. This monograph is the beginning of that journey.

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

23 March 2004: Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan.

The commander's battle-update brief that evening had concluded a bit later than normal, and Captain Blue was looking forward to his midnight shift change that was now only two hours away. His daily twelve-hour shift was soon going to wrap up. However, Captain Blue observed Lieutenant Colonel Howitz approaching Captain Green, the Fires Cell captain, with a time-sensitive tasking. Howitz had been working as the Fires Support Coordinator in the Fires Cell located within the Joint Operations Center (JOC) for about six months now. In his role, Howitz supervises, directs, and de-conflicts all indirect fire requests within the Afghanistan area of operations in support of a combined joint task force. In short, he manages Army artillery and coalition fixed wing air support. "We need to send the hogs down to Kandahar to confirm if there is a white pick-up truck at the following grid, ready to copy?", Howitz states to Captain Green. "Roger that sir, ready to copy," retorts Green. Howitz quickly passes the grid to Captain Green, upon which he repeats it back to Howitz. "Good copy, make it happen," Howitz quips as he was already back on the move to his office.

Captain Blue, the fighter duty officer, sat behind Capt. Green and witnessed the transaction. Blue had been in theater for four months now and was serving as the Air Force representative in the Air Support Operations Center, responsible for providing and coordinating Army requests for air support. It had taken a while, but he had finally

gotten into his battle groove. However, he had not quite gotten used to the army O-5 telling an army O-3, who in turn tells an air force O-3 what to do with airplanes. It seemed strange--*why wouldn't the Army colonel just talk directly to the air force captain about using airpower? That's my expertise! I guess that's just how it works around here*, thought the young Captain Blue. The colonel had disappeared just as fast as he arrived, and Blue was now starting to understand fully the implications of the order.

The JOC was a hub of activity. Staff officers ranging from O-3 to O-5 were busy attending to their functional activities to plan and execute their portion of the war. The facility housing the JOC was about the size of a small theater, and had stadium seating for all functional staffs facing forward towards large TV screens, which facilitated easy command, control, and communication among the staff. Each staff-officer location had its own computers and some had radio communications gear that would rudely interrupt conversations at times with the sounds of situation reports, requests, and at times, gunfire.

The task force was preparing for increased insurgent activity as the 2004 spring thaw rapidly approached. There were no organic artillery pieces in Afghanistan for coalition use, so the task force commander was reliant upon his "airborne artillery," the rotary- and fixed-wing aviation assets that would provide air support for the campaign.

Captain Blue expressed his reservations with the young Army officer, who outranked him not necessarily by seniority but by his de-facto seating position on the tiered JOC floor. "Dude, I have some serious reservations about Colonel Howitz's request. Number one, from their current keypad just west of here, it will take the A-10s a little over an hour to get down to Kandahar, they will be on station for about thirty to forty-five minutes and then will have to bingo out to return to Bagram because of fuel.

Additionally, at this time of night, I don't have tanker support in the air right now and I can't get it for another three hours, so they will have to make due with the gas they have. They will only have about thirty minutes of playtime to find this 'pick-up truck.' Second, the hog pilots only have a Pave Penny pod, which means they are relying on their night vision goggles as their sole source of vision at night. That means they can see different shades of green and grey, but that's it. So, even if there was a pick-up truck at that location, they wouldn't be able to tell you what color it is, and they certainly won't be able to confirm that it is white." Captain Blue could see that his fellow comrade was getting a bit uncomfortable with the conversation but he nonetheless continued, "Third, if we divert the hogs down to Kandahar, that pulls them off station here and what happens if we get a troops in contact around Kabul or start taking another rocket attack here at Bagram? If that happens, we effectively have removed the hogs from a quick response option, and we will have to launch the birds that are on ground alert here at Bagram. We can certainly launch the ground-alert close air support, but we are assuming risk and we will lose some of our flexibility for later response options if we do so. I just don't think this juice is worth the squeeze." Blue could see that Green was now turning a bit flush and was shifting in his seat. It looks like Blue got his attention, "Finally, let's just say the hog pilots miraculously identify the pick-up truck at said grid as white in color, then what? Are you guys going to launch the quick reaction force? We both know that it will take at least four hours to assemble the QRF, launch them, and fly down to Kandahar. Meanwhile, at best, the A-10s will depart approximately forty-five minutes after we tell the QRF to launch. That means this pick-up truck will then be unobserved for roughly three hours prior to the QRF getting there, which at any time the truck can get up and

scoot. The whole thing is pointless and a waste of assets." Green was on the edge of his seat now and ready to retort, "Look Blue, I don't know what you want me to do. We have our marching orders and this is what we are going to do." Captain Blue was disappointed at the response--he didn't understand why the captain wouldn't address the situation with his boss. *How can anyone be so mindless to execute something that has zero chance of success?* Captain Blue was becoming increasingly frustrated at the thought of wasting resources; resources that cost about fifteen thousand dollars per hour to operate, and the task force commander would be taking a significant operational risk by pulling the assets away from the historical hot-bed area of recent enemy activity. Captain Blue wasn't the only one frustrated by the situation, Captain Green was equally frustrated, but for different reasons.

Green was dumbfounded by Blue's apparent disregard for his and his boss' authority. He couldn't believe that the air force captain was challenging their direction--*He is a support asset and we are the main effort. Why doesn't this jet jockey just follow orders?* However, after ten minutes passed, Captain Green suddenly got up and went to see his boss, Howitz. Captain Green returned a short while later, and then followed ten minutes later by Lieutenant Colonel Howitz.

The air force captain was a bit nervous when the seasoned fire support coordinator approached. He really had not established a relationship with the Army lieutenant colonel. The colonel spent most of his time in his office, in meetings with the General, or in between. Blue noticed that the colonel really didn't interact with captains from his own service very much, let alone some air force captain. Instead, he spent most of his time with majors and above…mostly above. Interactions with this mysterious man

had been limited at best. The colonel approached with purpose and queried, "How are we doing on moving those A-10s?" Captain Blue sized up the imposing figure standing above him; it was immediately apparent based on the colonel's body language that he wasn't really interested in a lively conversation. "Sir, I can move the birds down to Kandahar if that is what you want but I do have some significant reservations." "Copy that captain. Let's make it happen then, thanks." The colonel was gone.

* * * * * * *

Unfortunately, the above story is not only illustrative, but also true. The names of the individuals are fictitious. The example demonstrates how culture can negatively influence the effectiveness and efficiency of joint operations. Although it is just one example, similar narratives play out every day during the joint interactions of U.S. military officers and non-commissioned officers. By the time you read this paper, there will be another armed forces officer that becomes frustrated with his/her sister-service interactions; a story that he/she will share with peers and yield lasting impressions that will not be productive or encouraging for the joint team. Many will attribute the friction to "personality conflicts," but it goes much deeper than that.

The study of military or service culture is not a new one. However, the research available is limited. Carl Builder, Alastair Finlan, and Dr. James Pierce are the most notable researchers on the topic of military or service culture. While the limited previous research has highlighted unique attributes of each of the Services, very few, if any, have provided insights into how the uniqueness of each service culture might cause friction between them. This paper's goal is to do just that--start examining the uniqueness of the service cultures and speculate, sometimes based on diametrically opposed service culture traits, where *service friction* is most likely to occur.

Under the context of service friction, this monograph will investigate the implications of a senior military leader's own service culture on his/her ability to employ military forces effectively in combat as a Joint Force. Cultural traits infused into the individual by the respective US military departments (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines) could negatively influence inter-service collaboration and coordination, joint staff interactions, command decisions, and Joint Force employment effectiveness. *It is this author's thesis that a senior military leader's own cultural bias, combined with a lack of understanding and appreciation of fellow sister-service culture, causes service friction that negatively influences team effectiveness, and therefore the skillful employment of the Joint Force.*

Effective and efficient employment of multi-service military forces is essential to a Joint Force Commander's (JFC) success. Although efficiency has rightly been a lower priority for combatant commanders in war, future conflicts suggest that a smaller joint force will demand it. Joint leadership should measure combatant commanders by how well he/she employs the joint forces under his/her control. Specifically, the JFC's own service culture bias, understanding of other service cultures, as well as the appreciation of sister-service capabilities and limitations, directly affects his/her level of efficacy when employing the joint force. The Joint Forces Staff College, where many officers receive their joint professional military education, has made efforts to mitigate this service-friction shortfall. The college is responsible for the mission of joint acculturation through education:

> Understanding the unique Service (and agency or multinational) cultures helps foster comprehension of the challenges toward, and the value of, a thoroughly joint perspective. Because cultural distinctions breed different strategies, doctrines, and preferences for organization, operations and

> planning, it is important to understand those cultural distinctions. Understanding Service cultures extends beyond simply acknowledging and understanding physical differences, language nuances, technological dependencies and other artifacts; it extends to the understanding of espoused values and basic assumptions (Edgar Schein, 2010, pages 1 through 5). While artifacts are often apparent to other cultures, values and assumptions tend to be more deeply rooted and are often exposed only through careful study, immersion and extended interaction. Only through better understanding of each other's norms, values and assumptions can real trust and interdependency eventually be forged.[1]

Although the Services are beginning to place more emphasis on acculturation, they often dismiss friction between themselves as conflicts of "personality." Service friction is much deeper--it is rooted in service culture, not simply personality. If the thesis proves true, the Department of Defense should consider adjusting the Joint Professional Military Education programs to place continual emphasis on the unique Service Cultures, focusing on joint service acculturation, such that better sister-service understanding and appreciation could yield improved joint force employment in the future. Furthermore, Joint Acculturation is a journey, not a destination. Changes in Service and Joint education, along with joint operational assignments are required to inculcate Service Acculturation throughout the Services. Edgar Schein noted:

> …it is a powerful, latent, and often unconscious set of forces that determine both our individual and collective behavior, ways of perceiving, thought patterns, and values. Organizational culture in particular matters because cultural elements determine strategy, goals, and modes of operating. The values and thought patterns of leaders and senior managers are partially determined by their own cultural backgrounds and their shared experience. If we want to make organizations more efficient and effective, then we must understand the role that culture plays in organizational life.[2]

[1] Joint Forces Staff College, *The Joint Staff Officer's Guide, 4th Ed.* (Norfolk: JFSC-NDU, 2014), xviii.
[2] Edgar H. Schein, *The Corporate Culture Survival Guide* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1999), 14.

Contemporary American military history, such as the Vietnam War and Operations Eagle Claw, Urgent Fury, and Anaconda, to name a few, has shown that U.S. military commanders often struggled to properly integrate and employ the Joint Force. This paper will show that a senior military leader's own service culture bias, combined with a lack of cultural understanding and appreciation of his/her fellow sister-services (lack of acculturation), negatively affects his/her ability to employ the Joint Force to its full potential.

The research methodology consists of a literature review to identify the existing or perceived service cultures within the Department of Defense (U.S. Army, Navy, Marines, and Air Force). The monograph will first review each of the four Service cultures, focusing the discussion on unique cultural aspects that are most likely to affect joint interactions. Next, the author will review two historical case studies to provide operational examples. Finally, a summative analysis of the literature review and the Services' cultures, combined with the analysis of service interactions in two operational case studies, will reveal four predominant *inter-service cultural friction points* that are most likely to impact Service interactions: 1) Conflicting Intra-Service Hierarchies (Combat Arms vs. Support), 2) Rank-Responsibility Disparities (Rank vs. Responsibility), 3) Obedience Disparity (Disciplined Obedience vs. The Thinking Man), and 4) Independence Disparity (Dependent vs. Independent).

The historical case studies discussed in Chapter 3, Operations Eagle Claw and Anaconda, reveal correlations between service culture and inter-service interactions in the joint operational context. Due to time constraints, it is important to note that the

author is highlighting two case studies only. However, the author challenges the reader to find any U.S. modern conflict where service culture friction does not occur.

In conclusion, the author will make recommendations in the joint professional education and operational assignment processes to address mitigation of service culture friction, focusing the joint force on better preparedness for future conflicts and stressing the importance of a cohesive joint team.

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CHAPTER 2

Service Culture

In talking about organizational culture with colleagues and members of organizations, I often find that we agree that "it" exists and that it is important in its effects, but when we try to define it, we have completely different ideas of what "it" is.

-- Edgar H. Schein, *The Corporate Culture Survival Guide*

In the twenty-first century, the days of any service operating as a truly independent actor are long since past. The five services fight together as a team, which means they must plan and train as a team…Each service has its own uniforms, customs, and traditions. On a deeper level, each has its own culture. It is culture that defines and describes any organization best. It also best defines and describes what it means to be a member of that organization.

-- The Armed Forces Officer

After reviewing research from anthropologists, social scientists, and researchers on the topic of culture, it becomes evident that there is only one consensus -- the academic debate on culture is lively and no one can agree on a definition. Edgar Schein, a noted author on organizational culture, defines culture as:

> A pattern of shared basic assumptions that was learned by a group as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.[1]

Schein also stresses the importance of shared history: "Any social unit that has some kind of shared history will have evolved a culture, with the strength of that culture

[1] Edgar H. Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership, 3rd Ed.* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2004), 17.

dependent on the length of its existence, the stability of the group's membership, and the emotional intensity of the actual historical experiences they have shared."[2]

Among others, Kerry M. Kartchner examined culture at the strategic level, specifically defining *strategic culture* as "shared beliefs, assumptions, and modes of behavior, derived from common experiences and accepted narratives (both oral and written), that shape collective identity and relationships to other groups, and which determine appropriate ends and means for achieving security objectives."[3]

Another noted historian and scholar of culture, Colin S. Gray, suggested that strategic culture is "the prime mover of thought, judgment, policy, and all that follows therefrom…it must always be present as an actual, or potential, influence on our decisions and behavior."[4] One could conclude that strategic culture has an influence on strategic thought, and therefore similar impact on the formulation of national security strategy and foreign affairs policy. Likewise, the same cultural impact could apply for interactions within the Armed Services at the operational and tactical levels of war, which in turn would heavily influence the efficacy of the Joint Force Commander and his joint team.

The culture of the individual U.S. Armed Services, which the author will simply label as "Service Culture," is what this paper will focus on. Service culture forms the foundation of a military organization's identity--similar to how an individual's personality shapes his/her identity, culture shapes an organization's identity, which also

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[2] Ibid., 11.

[3] Kerry M. Kartchner, *Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Crucible of Strategic Culture* (Washington DC: Defense Threat Reduction Agency, 2006), 3. Kartchner formulated his definition based on a review of foreign policy literature written by Valerie Hudson and Martin W. Simpson III.

[4] Colin S. Gray, *Out of the Wilderness: Prime Time for Strategic Culture by National Institute for Public Policy* (Washington DC: Defense Threat Reduction Agency, 2006), 14.

influences individual behavior. Previous research in this field of study focuses on defining individual service cultures--that is not the intent of this paper. Previous research has simply defined the individual culture of the Services without exploring the cultural implications for the interactions between them. Therefore, this paper focuses not simply on the uniqueness of the individual Service cultures, but more importantly on the *interaction* between the different Service cultures, the *service friction* that it causes, and the resulting operational implications of that joint interaction. Specifically, this monograph dedicates its weight of effort towards identifying service culture attributes that are diametrically opposed, and therefore more likely to cause tactical or operational friction between the Services, which henceforth will be termed "service friction." Before one can understand the friction between the Services, a brief review of the individual cultural traits of the U.S. Armed Services is in order.[5] However, it is also important to note how lack of mutual respect and trust contribute to service friction.

Trust is the most important variable needed between combat arms personnel when engaged in combat. However, the foundation of mutual respect is the precursor to trust. Officers of different Services must have the perception that their fellow sister-service officers respect their contributions, their limitations, and their capabilities. Without mutual respect between the personnel of differing Services, it is impossible to develop relationships that lead to shared understanding and trust between them. For example, if an armed forces officer perceives that another sister-service officer does not mutually respect, appreciate, and understand the capabilities of his/her Service, then the

[5] For the purposes of this paper's focus on joint operational impacts, the U.S. Coast Guard will not be reviewed. Although the Coast Guard can fall under Title 10 operations like the other services, it is primarily subordinated to the Department of Homeland Defense.

disgruntled and offended officer will never fully trust the other officer to properly utilize his/her Service capabilities towards the joint fight. Relationships provide the linkage for establishing mutual respect and trust. Mutual respect sets the foundation for the establishment of relationships. Relationships enable shared understanding to occur. Shared understanding provides insight on competence, capabilities, and limitations for the establishment of trust, which supports joint combat effectiveness (see figure 1).



Figure 1. Joint Mutual Respect Cycle[6]

Joint training and combat experiences can either improve or degrade mutual respect between the services based on service performance. This mutual respect cycle is continuous. Conveyance of a Service's capabilities and limitations (understanding), which is important to ensure proper utilization and employment of joint capabilities, will likely occur after the establishment of a relationship based on mutual respect. Besides training and combat experiences, understanding the key attributes of an individual service's culture can help build understanding that strengthens mutual respect.

[6] Author created model. All rights reserved.

United States Army Culture

The U.S. Army, similar to the other services, has many cultural traits. However, this monograph seeks to highlight only the service traits that have significant impact on joint interactions. Therefore, in the context of joint interactions and based on the author's research, the author classifies the Army's cultural traits that have the most influence on interactions with the other Services into five categories: Service to Nation, Intra-service Hierarchy, Stability and Control, Disciplined Obedience, and Institutionalism.

Service to Nation

The U.S. Army's service culture coincides with the birth of the United States of America, and therefore inculcates the value of service to the nation. According to Carl Builder, a notable researcher on culture within the U.S. Armed Services, the Army worships at the altar of "service to country," and it cast its officers from that iron.[7] Indeed, the motto of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point is "Duty, Honor, and Country."[8] The Army's origin came from the Revolutionary War and it still consists of "citizen-soldiers" dedicated to the service of country. According to Builder, the Army is the most secure of the three services, with its belief that warfighters may fight military campaigns from the air or sea, but in the end, soldiers will need to take and hold ground. The Army is concerned with the size of its active duty force, placing more emphasis on people than on equipment. Because of the Army's dependency on the U.S. Air Force and

[7] Carl H. Builder, *The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 19-20.
[8] United States Military Academy, "Educating Future Army Officers for a Changing World," West Point, http://www.usma.edu/strategic/SiteAssets/SitePages/Home/EFAOCW.pdf (accessed December 19, 2014).

Navy to meet its transportation requirements, the Army is the most accepting of "jointness."

Intra-Service (Tribal) Hierarchy

Builder discovered that the Army has a unique sub-culture (tribal) hierarchy of combat arms, then support. The Army values and promotes their infantry, armor, and artillery combat arms officer over their support officers.[9] This tribal hierarchy is significant when considering Army interactions with its sister-services.

The Army inculcates its officers to believe that their combat arms personnel are superior to their support officers. Builder noted, "In the Army, the basic division is between the traditional combat arms (e.g., infantry, artillery, and armor) and all others, who are seen in (and fully accept) *support* roles to the combat arms."[10] Whom the Army promotes provides further proof or validation towards the belief that "support" officers are less prestigious in the eyes of Army culture when compared to combat arms personnel. Indeed, a review of the officers that have served as the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army reveals that the Chief has been a combat arms officer ever since Douglas McArthur held the position in 1930, if not earlier.[11] Specifically, fourteen infantry officers, seven armor officers, and five artillery officers rose to the Army's highest position during this period, which validates Builder's prestige hierarchy of infantry, armor, and artillery officers, in order. No support officers held the position during this

[9] Ibid., 26.
[10] Builder, 26. Italics added by author for emphasis.
[11] Wikipedia, "Chief of Staff of the United States Army," Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chief_of_Staff_of_the_United_States_Army (accessed November 22, 2014).

period. Notably, despite the Army's relatively large aviator community, no aviators have served in the Chief's position. In this author's opinion, this is significant because it reflects the conscious or subconscious perspective of Army officers towards support officers or "support assets." This is *not* to say this is a fault when one considers it in the context of the individual service, as the other services similarly place their front-line warfighters at the pinnacle of prestige. Rightly, the Army holds their warfighters, those serving and sacrificing at the front lines, at the highest levels of respect. However, it does have significant implications when considered in the joint context.

For example, the Army's logisticians, medical corps, engineers, transportation personnel, and aviators support their infantry, armor, and artillery officers. This can cause friction between Army officers and officers of aviator-heavy Services such as the Navy and Air Force because the former might be inclined to view the latter as inferior. Contrarily, and making the matter worse, the very sister-service officers, such as ship captains and aviators, which the Army officers are likely biased to view as "support" officers, are viewed by the Air Force and Navy as combat arms officers at the highest levels of prestige.[12] Furthermore, this infers that the Army's intra-service hierarchy is significant because it supports their innate belief that the front line warriors--their infantry, armor, and artillery officers--should have *control* over "support" assets. Dr. James Pierce, a retired Army Colonel, conducted a study of Army culture that highlighted the Army's preference for "stability and control."[13]

[12] See the operational examples provided in the historical case studies section of this monograph, which discusses this dichotomy further and the associated joint force ramifications.
[13] James G. Pierce, *Is the Organizational Culture of the U.S. Army congruent with the Professional Development of its Senior Level Officer Corps?* (Carlisle PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2010).

Stability and Control

In 2010, Dr. Pierce conducted a thorough empirical analysis of U.S. Army culture. In his monograph, Dr. Pierce examined the Army's organizational culture to determine if it was congruent with professional development of its senior officers. Pierce utilized a cultural assessment model developed in 1999 by Cameron and Quinn called the Organizational Cultural Assessment Instrument (OCAI). A researcher uses the OCAI model to determine the culture of an organization, defining four culture types: Clan Culture, Adhocracy Culture, Hierarchy Culture, and Market Culture (see figure 2). During a two-year period, Pierce surveyed 533 senior Army officers in the rank of lieutenant colonel and colonel attending the Army War College to determine their perspectives on the current Army culture and what they felt should be the preferred culture. Pierce used surveys to collect data, and then plotted the results on an OCAI quad chart. He determined the Army's dominant culture is the "Market" culture (38% of plots), and the "Hierarchy" culture was second yielding 29% of the results. Collectively, 67% of the OCAI plots favored a culture of "stability and control." Pierce noted his surprise at the results:

> During the initial analysis this finding was somewhat of a surprise. Based on the present researcher's 30 year career as an Army officer and as an Army civilian and extensive research with this subject matter the expectation was that the current U.S. Army culture would fall into the Hierarchy quadrant…What the data tell us is that the future senior leaders of the U.S. Army profession clearly perceive that the deep-seated underlying assumptions that comprise the Army culture are focused on organizational stability and control as opposed to innovation, flexibility, and long-term growth….In summary, this study found that the dominant organizational culture type and strength, as indicated by the direction and magnitude of the various quadrant scores, of the U.S. Army profession is strongly supportive of stability and control.[14]

[14] Ibid., 79-80.



Figure 2. Competing Values of Leadership, Effectiveness, Organizational Theory, and Organizational Culture Profiles. Source: Adapted from Kim S. Cameron & Robert E. Quinn, *Diagnosing and Changing Organizational Culture* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2011), Tables 3.2 & 4.1. Note: It is important to note the two axis of Stability & Control vs. Flexibility & Discretion, and Internal Focus & Integration vs. External Focus & Differentiation.

Pierce also noted the significance of the combined 67% score for the Market and Hierarchy culture quadrants. He noted:

> The dominant organizational culture type and strength of the U.S. Army profession is highly reflective of stability and control and can be characterized by an emphasis on hard-driving competitiveness within a very formalized and structured place to work, as opposed to being distinguished by innovation, flexibility, and long-term growth, which are the characteristics that most clearly represent the hallmarks of professional cultures.[15]

Additionally, Pierce surveyed the respondents to determine what would be their preferred Army culture. Pierce found that the "preferred" culture was the "Clan" culture, with 29% of the plots. However, the Market culture was a close second at 27% of the plots, perhaps reflecting the strength or pervasive influence of the current Market culture. More notably, Pierce found that the preferred culture plot for Adhocracy yielded 25%, and a Hierarchy plot of only 19%. Pierce noted that the shift of desire from the current "now" culture to the "preferred" culture represented a dramatic increase of 109% and 37% for the Adhocracy and Clan culture preferences respectively. Preference for Hierarchy and Market cultures decreased 33% and 29% respectively. Pierce again concluded:

> In summary, this monograph discovered that the "Preferred" dominant organizational culture type and strength of the U.S. Army profession is strongly supportive of flexibility and discretion and can be characterized by a concern for people and teamwork, as well as a strong interest in innovation, initiative, creativity, and a long-term emphasis on growth and the acquisition of new resources.[16]

In summary, Dr. Pierce's monograph has significant implications in regards to assessing probable service culture friction between the Services. Specifically, his

[15] Ibid., 98.
[16] Ibid., 91.

findings regarding the Army's current cultural preference for "stability and control" are significant because this trait is the antithesis of organizations favoring "flexibility and discretion." However, the Army's apparent preference for a cultural shift towards "Clan" culture could be an indication that the Army is willing to shift more towards flexibility and discretion. The Army's recent initiative to implement more "mission command" leadership might be an indicator of a cultural shift in the Clan Culture direction. In May 2012, the Army released a new Army Doctrine Publication 6-0, *Mission Command*. The document defines Mission Command philosophy as the "exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable the disciplined initiative within the commander's intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations."[17] The publication notes that the principles of mission command will "build cohesive teams through mutual trust, create shared understanding, provide a clear commander's intent, exercise disciplined initiative, use mission orders, and accept prudent risk…The principles of mission command assist commanders and staff in blending the *art of command* with the *science of control*."[18] A shift in Army cultural mindset of this magnitude will certainly take time. However, in the joint context, should this cultural shift fully materialize it would likely reduce the frequency of intra-service friction in the future by reducing the other Services' perceptions of the Army "controlling" or "interfering" with their operations. Short of that culture shift occurring, the Army will continue to expect disciplined obedience from their subordinates and support assets, which is paramount to stability and control.

[17] The Department of the Army, *ADP 6-0: Mission Command*, Headquarters Dept. of the Army (Washington DC, 2012), iv.
[18] Ibid.

Disciplined Obedience

The Armed Forces Officer, published in 2007 by the Department of Defense, made notable observations on service culture as well. The publication highlighted key cultural attributes of the Army as joint mindset, soldiers as the centerpiece, a warrior ethos, every soldier a leader, mental and physical toughness, loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage.[19]

Builder also highlighted the Army's disciplined loyalty and obedience. One could view obedience as another aspect of loyalty. The Army culture is one of discipline and is highly dependent upon obedience, which is the ability of subordinates to follow orders. The Army is a large land force that depends on rapid maneuver, historically dependent upon quantitative superiority and overwhelming firepower. Builder noted that the Army measures its health largely by the number of active duty soldiers, and the size of the Army is a "salient measure of its readiness to fight or to expand, as may be demanded of it."[20] The mere nature of land warfare requires disciplined soldiers ready to maneuver, fight, and sacrifice their lives if required to achieve the military objective. Barbara W. Tuchman noted, the Army "exists to carry out the government's orders and when ordered into action does not ask 'Why?' or 'What for?'"[21] While this disciplined level of obedience is an imperative and necessary to command land forces to maneuver and engage enemy ground forces, and perhaps pay the ultimate sacrifice in the process, it could be a liability in the interactions with sister-services. Although this cultural loyalty

[19] United States Department of Defense, *The Armed Forces Officer* (Washington DC: Potomac Books, 2007), 79-81.
[20] Builder, 22.
[21] Barbara W. Tuchman, "Human Nature is Responsible," *The American Military: Opposing Viewpoints,* ed. David L. Bender (Saint Paul, MN: Greenhaven Press, 1983), 74.

and obedience is the norm within the Army, sister-service officers could perceive their interactions with Army officers as condescending or overbearing. Specifically, the unique mission requirements and core competencies of the Air Force and the Navy often afford more time to prosecute. This "time disparity" in the decision cycle often permits more honest debate and discussions of "why" and "how better" to accomplish the mission. Among all the Services there are situations that are time critical and therefore demand immediate compliance. However, there are times when the situation allows more deliberation and respectable debate. Nonetheless, the Soldier, and the Marine for that matter, frequently face situations that require quick decisions and unwavering compliance through action. This decision-cycle disparity drives officer leadership styles and cultures that can cause significant friction between the Services based on obedience expectations. This underlying service friction sometimes undermines the establishment of mutual respect--as noted earlier, the precursor to trust. Both Builder and the Armed Forces Officer publication stressed the Army's unwavering loyalty. Another author, Alastair Finlan, also highlighted a unique Army cultural trait that has implications for loyalty.

Institutionalism

Finlan noted that an individual's "innate belief" is rooted in organizational beliefs and assumptions, as defined by noted organizational culture expert E.H. Schien[22], and that this innate belief may hold "an influential position in preference selection."[23] Finlan goes on to state, "It would be logical to infer that in times of crisis and uncertainty,

[22] Schein, 26.
[23] Alastair Finlan, *Contemporary Military Culture and Strategic Studies: US and UK Armed Forces in the 21st Century* (New York: Taylor & Francis Group, 2013), 26.

institutions will almost unconsciously reach for past ideas, especially ideas that have proved successful in wars gone by, such that they have been elevated to the unquestioned status of an assumption."[24] This is significant as it begs the question: Is it possible that the Army's devout loyalty *of* service (to country) will also at times inappropriately instill overwhelming bias of its officers towards loyalty *to* Service (the organization)? Finlan argues that the Army sees itself as an *institution* solidified in the deep roots of early American history:

> The newly founded nation required military support, and in order for the American military to flourish, it required the establishment of permanent institutions in order to retain its corporate knowledge…The origin of an army has significant teleological implications for its cultural disposition and outlook on warfare as a whole…It also supports critical motivational beliefs that sacrifice, to die for one's country, is a noble and worthwhile endeavor…[Institutionalism] embodies the transformation from temporary organization to permanent institution of state--the inauguration of collective self-awareness--and the need to constantly renew as well as protect a specific identity and outlook.[25]

Finlan's collective observations are significant in that it infers that if you combine strong innate beliefs and loyalty to country with the institution, it is possible to have officers with disproportional bias towards their own military service and its capabilities. Combine this aspect with the Army officer's tribal hierarchy perspective of combat arms over support personnel and assets, and it provides a ripe environment for devout preference for own service capabilities despite availability of more lethal "support" assets. Unquestionably, service parochialism exists in all the U.S. Services, but perhaps it is a stronger influence in the Army. It is this operational parochialism, or bias towards using its own organic assets, that could have negative implications on the joint team

[24] Ibid., 26.
[25] Ibid., 22, 29-30.

efficacy, and therefore the effectiveness of the Joint Force Commander. However, there is another Service that the United States considers as one of its primal institutions, the U.S. Navy.

United States Navy Culture

In the context of joint interactions and based on the author's research, the author classifies the Navy's cultural traits that have the most influence on interactions with the other Services into three categories: "Royalty Factor," Intra-service Hierarchy, and Joint Resistance.

Royalty Factor

The U.S. Navy seems to be the most "royal" of the U.S. Armed Services. The author's term of "royalty factor" is a collective description of multiple variables such as institutionalism, segregation, independence, and power and prestige.

The U.S. Navy, similar to the Army, also views itself as an *institution*. According to Builder, the Navy is "supremely confident in its legitimacy as an independent institution."[26] The Navy's roots date back to early American independence and the high seas under the leadership command of such early naval pioneers as Commodore Matthew Perry. Perry opened up trade with Japan in the 1850s, where he wore multiple hats of government, simultaneously representing the United States as a presidential emissary, sailor, soldier, diplomat, ambassador, and a tradesman, as "he threatened war and

[26] Builder, 29.

negotiated treaties with feudal Japan."[27] Builder further explained that the Navy's strong sense of independence and stature further enables its strong sense of institutionalism; the Navy sees itself as the *only* institution, or royalty, with the ability to project sea power forward for national interests. The Navy is "the supernational institution that has inherited the British Navy's throne to naval supremacy…it is about preserving and wielding sea power for America as a maritime nation. The means to those ends are the institution and its traditions, both of which provide for a permanence beyond the people who serve them."[28]

The second aspect of the royalty factor is *segregation*. The U.S. Navy appears to be the service most focused on segregation between not only officers and enlisted, but segregation of their officer corps as well. The Navy warfighting mission requires a disparate ship crew that must work, fight, sleep, socialize, and occasionally relax all in the same afloat environment. Therefore, the Navy's unique mission, and vessel from which it executes the mission, requires a separate level of segregation that is unique from the other services. Whereby the other Services can more easily provide geographically separated quarters to help separate work from play, the same task becomes more challenging and space limited on a ship. In other words, to separate sailors from each other to provide a level of personal privacy requires a higher, and more visible, level of segregation, which is imperative to maintaining good order and discipline on a wayward ship--the type of traditional order and discipline that in the past enabled successful mission accomplishment while simultaneously mitigating the risk of mutiny.

[27] Ibid., 18.
[28] Ibid., 32.

A sidestep discussion on obedience is pertinent at this point. The Navy uses segregation to maintain order and discipline--a critical cultural trait needed for the faithful obedience required to follow the captain's commands and those of the ship's officers. Without faithful obedience on a wayward ship, the Navy's expeditionary mission would be at risk.

The Navy is the only Service where the warfighter's residence is his/her weapon system; the ship is the sailor's living space, social space, eating space, and sleeping space--in essence a sailor's home, and also a war machine. Rightly, the Navy's practice of strict segregation fosters a culture, similar to the Army, of disciplined rank-consciousness through rank segregation. This aspect is significant because it can be a point of service friction between the Services that are less "rank conscious" because of their culture, such as the Air Force, which will be discussed later.

The third aspect of the royalty factor is *independence*. The Navy is a nomadic and expeditionary force by its very nature, which demands a certain level of independence and autonomy to be successful. *The Armed Forces Officer* noted that the Navy is the most independent of the Services.[29] According to former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General David Jones, "The Department of the Navy is the most strategically independent of the Services--it has its own army, navy and air force. It is least dependent on others. It would prefer to be given a mission, retain complete control over all the assets, and be left alone."[30] Builder noted that the Navy's foundation in

[29] United States Department of Defense, *The Armed Forces Officer* (Washington DC: Potomac Books, 2007), 88.
[30] David C. Jones, "What's Wrong with Our Defense Establishment," *New York Times Magazine*, November 7, 1982, 73.

independence also strongly supported its institutionalism, enabled by a strong sense of independence and stature.[31]

The Navy sees itself as *the* only institution, or royalty, with the ability to project power at sea, and it will fight to maintain its independence and autonomy. The Navy's long-held tradition of autonomy was born from the inability of communications to go over the horizon, which necessitated independent command with "godlike" responsibilities, uncommon to that of the other Services.[32] This aspect of naval culture is so engrained that it fostered its own unique terminology, "command by negation," which is still in practice today and gives the Navy captain the freedom of autonomous action, advising higher headquarters when time or communication permits, and whereby silence is consent. "This practice relieves seniors of some of the burdens of routine decision making, yet allows them to step in when they disagree with the proposed action."[33] The Navy's devout belief of independence is significant because the other Services' officers could view the Navy as not being a "team player," and therefore it could be a point of operational service friction between the Navy and the other Services, especially those biased towards "stability and control."

Another byproduct of the Navy's culture of independence is its resistance to "meddling." As discussed previously, the Navy expects its officers to execute "command by negation," and any attempts to overly control or micro-manage the fleet would be seen as unnecessary meddling. This phobia to meddling is significant because it could cause ineffective coordination during joint operations.

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[31] Builder, 31.
[32] Builder, 18.
[33] Lesa A. McComas, *The Naval Officer's Guide* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2011), 233.

The fourth and final aspect of the royalty factor is *power and prestige*. Margaret Sprout, the author of "Mahan: Evangelist of Seapower," noted that "Mahan's studies convinced him that sea power, conceived on a broader scale, would constitute for the United States…an instrument of policy serving to enhance the nation's power and prestige."[34] No other singular U.S. military service can project land, air, and naval power from the sea. "Like many other navies, the U.S. Navy has always seen itself as intimately tied to national power--protecting it, enhancing it, advancing it."[35] Sailors, and specifically the officers who lead them, are confident in projecting sea power around the world, and are fully aware of the immense power and prestige that comes with their noble responsibilities. Navy prestige is rooted in being the *first-line defense* for the Nation, which it became when the United States defeated the British during the Revolutionary War and extinguished the internal Native American threat to its frontier.[36] In other words, without an internal threat to U.S. sovereignty, the Navy became the de facto first-line defense against external aggression, defeating any would-be aggressors at sea before they could reach the homeland. This power and prestige aspect is significant because other Service officers could perceive young, immature naval officers, if not reserved and humble in personality, as arrogant or presumptuous, and could therefore fuel service friction in some situations.

[34] George E. Thibault, *The Art and Practice of Military Strategy* (Washington DC: National Defense University, 1984), 114.
[35] US DoD, *Armed Forces Officer*, 88.
[36] Finlan, 36.

Intra-Service (Tribal) Hierarchy

Builder noted, "The Navy is the most elaborate in its distinctions among, and the relative ranking of, its various components, branches, or activities. The implicit intra-service distinctions within the Navy provide an extensive, fine-structured, hierarchical pecking order from top to bottom."[37] Builder noted that the Navy firmly established carrier-based fighter aviation at the pinnacle of the hierarchy ever since the victory of World War II, where successful engagements such as the battle of Midway left an indelible impression on the institution. Unlike the Air Force, the Navy is less "toy-oriented," but does measure the hierarchy of its officers based on the "platforms" upon which they serve. Builder defined the naval platform hierarchy in order: carrier-based aviation, submarine warfare, surface warfare, and mine warfare. Indeed, if one believes that a Service promotes what they value, the recent history of officers that have been the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) closely approximates Builder's hierarchy assertion.

Since Admiral King was the CNO in 1942, and up to and including Admiral Greenert's term in 2014, eleven aviators or carrier strike group experienced officers, six surface warfare officers, and five submarine warfare officers have held the Navy's highest position.[38] The disparity between surface and submarine warfare officers is not significant enough to invalidate Builder's claim. This tribal hierarchy is significant because it means that the Navy considers carrier aviation warfare officers to be the most sought after command opportunities--those considered the most prestigious of command assignments. However, it is important to note that the naval aviators view themselves

[37] Builder, 25.

[38] Navy History and Heritage Command, "Biographies in Naval History," Department of the Navy, http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq35-1.htm (accessed November 28, 2014).

first as naval officers, then naval aviators.[39] Furthermore, the Navy considers their carrier aviation warfare officers to be warfighters[40]; that is, combat arms personnel regularly engaging the enemy with lethal direct and indirect fires.

However, the Army soldier, and possibly the Marine Corps rifleman, based on their culture, could view these "flight suit wearers" as support assets for the soldiers or marines, and not as a separate warfighting arm in and of itself. This perceived combat-arms-versus-support disparity between the intra-service culture hierarchies of the Services, which yields a diametrically opposed viewpoint, causes friction between the Services. Specifically, this service friction is most likely to occur between the Navy/Air Force and the Army, and to a lesser extent, the Marines.

Joint Resistance

Although the Navy's independence is an advantage as discussed previously, it is also a liability in a joint context. Builder noted that the Navy is the "most resistant to accepting the constraints of unification and 'jointness.'"[41] This aspect of the Navy culture is likely a result of the Navy's unique capacity to project naval, air, and land power. Furthermore, one could argue that the establishment of the U.S. Marine Corps under the Department of the Navy further exacerbates the independence mindset of the Navy and resistance towards full joint integration with the other Services.

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[39] Vicent Davis, *Post War Defense Policy and the U.S. Navy, 1943-1946* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1966), 120.
[40] McComas, 221.
[41] Builder, 30.

An operational example of the Navy's joint resistance occurred during the preparation for Operation Urgent Fury, the invasion of Grenada. The Army sent then-Major General Norman Schwarzkopf to ensure the Navy-led operation incorporated adequate ground forces planning, which had been lacking:

> Schwarzkopf had a chance to see interservice rivalry up close. When he arrived in Norfolk the day before the invasion to join Metcalf's staff, he said he "felt about as welcome as a case of mumps." Schwarzkopf says that shortly after his arrival Admiral McDonald told him: "Now, for chrissakes, try and be helpful, would you? We've got a tough job to do and we don't need the Army giving us a hard time."[42]

The interaction between McDonald and Schwarzkopf is indicative of the Navy's resistance to joint operations. Additionally, the last sentence of the quote infers that McDonald likely was familiar with the Army's penchant for control and stability and therefore tried to keep Schwarzkopf in check.

Another aspect of joint resistance materializes simply from the organization and operational limitations of the Navy itself. The Navy organization and training regimen centers on the Navy's deployment schedule. The Navy's rotational fleet deployments, combined with a smaller service fleet of ships, yield a home-station footprint that is not conducive to participating in stateside joint exercises with the Army and Air Force. Continued future force reductions will only exacerbate this joint training shortfall.

In summary, the "royalty factor," intra-service hierarchy, and joint resistance heavily influence the Navy's service culture. The independence of the Navy institution, an aspect of the royalty factor, is rooted in its long-held traditions. However, another

[42] James R. Locher, *Victory of the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon* (College Station, TX: Texas A & M University Press, 2002), 309.

U.S. Armed Service garnered much of its early tradition based on a fight for, and continued mindset of, independence--the U.S. Air Force.

United States Air Force Culture

In the context of joint interactions and based on the author's research, the author classifies the Air Force's cultural traits that have the most influence on interactions with the other Services into five categories: Independence, Technology-focused Qualitative Superiority, Intra-service Hierarchies, Rank vs. Responsibility, and Flexibility.

Independence

The Air Force fought to establish its independence from the Army in 1947. Builder noted that the U.S. Air Force was the most sensitive to "defending or guarding its legitimacy as an independent institution."[43] Indeed, the Air Force developed based on the beliefs of early aviation pioneers, such as Billy Mitchell, who fought for independence. "The concept of independence formed the bedrock of Air Force identity in its early days. Pioneer Airmen believed that the air arm must achieve service independence in order to operate most effectively and provide the single-minded focus to maximize airpower's potential."[44] Today, Airmen embrace the multi-domain perspective of air, space, land, and sea, and fully understand the significant strategic advantage that airborne freedom-of-maneuver permits at the tactical and operational levels of war.

[43] Ibid., 27.
[44] US DoD, *Armed Forces Officer*, 77.

The Air Force "is the keeper and wielder of the decisive instruments of war--the technological marvels of flight that have been adapted to war."[45] The U.S. Air Force is the most powerful air force in the world. Airmen are supremely confident about the decisiveness of airpower in terms of setting the conditions for victory. An example of this decisiveness occurred during Desert Storm. Robert Parrish and N.A. Andreacchio, a retired Army Lieutenant Colonel and Colonel, respectively, authored a biography on General Norman Schwarzkopf, which also documented Operation Desert Storm and noted airpower's effectiveness during the air campaign:

> In only a couple weeks the air campaign had made tremendous progress toward accomplishing the major objectives of destroying Saddam Hussein's nuclear, chemical, and biological production capability; eliminating any threat from the Iraqi air force; and neutralizing the Iraqi military's command and control system. The Scuds were a major problem because so many aircraft had to be diverted to searching for and destroying them, but except for that things were going extremely well--almost too well. A wave of speculation swept the States that this might actually be the first war ever won without ground troops. No one wanted more Allied casualties than were absolutely necessary, and influential people around the world were beginning to argue that there was no need to send in infantry and tanks. Always searching for a new angle, some news reporters and columnists suggested that if a ground war did start, it would be because the Army and Marine Corps didn't want the Air Force to get all the medals and glory.[46]

Airpower superiority on the battlefield provides the ultimate high ground. It provides the simultaneity of offensive firepower and defensive protection; offensive firepower to engage any target at will with ever-increasing precision, and defensive protection by providing surface forces the freedom to assimilate and maneuver without worry of attack from above. The Air Force establishes this airpower advantage through asymmetrical

[45] Builder, 33.
[46] Robert D. Parrish and N.A. Andreacchio, *Schwarzkopf: An Insider's View of the Commander and His Victory* (New York, NY: Bantam Books, 1991), 115.

advantages provided by focusing on high-technology systems that enable survival and lethality deep inside enemy territory. The early airpower advocates would likely have said that this level of focus on technological innovations that provide today's air dominance would not have been possible without the concentrated focus afforded through an independent institution.

Airmen's frustrations of inefficient utilization of airpower and lack of visionary air-mindedness provided zealous motivation for institutional independence. Today, the Air Force is especially sensitive to any attempts at unification or meddling in affairs that would yield results that are counter to a culture of air-mindedness, which can only occur from within an institution of Airmen. Specifically, an Air Force culture biased towards "flexibility and discretion," which is inherent in an independent and innovative mindset, could be at odds with other service cultures biased towards "stability and control."[47] An Airman believes that only through an independent air force, and the professionalism it produces, will the service retain its disciplined focus for airpower innovations, and therefore continue to produce asymmetric, high technology systems for the Nation's decisive warfare capabilities. This phobia of independence sensitivity can be a point of friction between the Services, especially if Air Force officers perceive land and sea officers using airpower inappropriately or ineffectively. This friction sometimes causes Airmen to resent the ground commanders they frequently support, especially if the commander or his/her staff marginalize or discount the officer's airpower expertise.

[47] R.E. Quinn and K.S. Cameron, *Paradox and Transformation: Toward a Theory of Change in Organization and Management* (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1988), 41.

Technology-Focused Qualitative Superiority

Builder noted that the Air Force worships at the altar of technology.[48] He also noted that the Air Force views the technology advantage as more important than the number of aircraft. In other words, the Air Force focuses more on qualitative superiority than on quantitative superiority.[49] Accordingly, the Air Force is the service that is most attached to its high-tech "toys," which enables its high-tech force.[50]

A high-tech, qualitatively superior air force is the core prerequisite that enables the Air Force to dominate in the air domain, thereby providing a decisive edge on the battlefield. For example, in practice, the Air Force would seek to capitalize on its high-tech asymmetric advantage by destroying a large enemy maneuver force before it attacks friendly ground forces, whereas the Army might be more inclined to destroy it with quantitative overwhelming firepower in a force-on-force scenario. Finlan noted the Army's preference for "overwhelming firepower" when he observed:

> The United States Army has in its possession the most advanced military equipment in the world. Its weapons of choice reflect its strongly held beliefs about waging warfare [sic]. For the U.S. Army, the importance of firepower or the ability to apply significant volumes of bullets, shells and explosives on a battlefield symbolises the character of its preferred weapons…The U.S. Army relies heavily on its capacity on all levels, from the infantry to the artillery, to target enemy formations with overwhelming quantities of firepower in order to ensure victory…In post-invasion Iraq, U.S. soldiers caught up in a vicious counter-insurgency campaign still tend to apply massive amounts of firepower in urban centres when faced with either a sniper or an ambush situation.[51]

[48] Builder, 19.
[49] Ibid., 21.
[50] Ibid., 23.
[51] Finlan, 28.

This is not to say that the Army and Marine Corps would not be more inclined to capitalize on the best weapons available to the joint force. However, generally speaking, the Services tend to favor their organic weapons during battle that they are more familiar with, which also tend to be more readily available. The Air Force's culture of high-tech mindedness is significant because it could cause service friction between the Air Force and the less technology-focused Services such as the Army and Marine Corps.

Intra-Service (Tribal) Hierarchies

As discussed earlier in this chapter, the Navy has its own unique tribal hierarchies among its officer corps, but their tribal communities still see themselves as naval officers first. In contrast, Builder noted that Air Force officers associate most with their specialty over their identity as an Airman. "The pride of association is with a machine, even before the institution."[52] For example, if one asked an Air Force officer what she did, she would likely reply that she was a fighter pilot before stating that she was an Air Force officer or Airman. Additionally, similar to the intra-service hierarchies of the Army and Navy, the Air Force has its own unique intra-service, or tribal, hierarchy. Builder correctly noted that in the Air Force the "division is between pilots and all others."[53] The criteria for officers to become Air Force aviators is the most selective and competitive process of the Air Force specialties. Accordingly, the Air Force places the most prestige on its aviators and the proof, similar to the other Services, is in the promotion system statistics.

[52] Ibid.
[53] Ibid., 27.

Within the aviator tribe itself, there is a sub-hierarchy as well. Since the Air Force's inception, fifteen fighter pilots, five bomber pilots, two airlift pilots, and one observer pilot held the Service's highest position, the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force.[54] Clearly, the Air Force idolizes its fighter pilots and ensures they fill the most powerful leadership positions within the institution. This is significant, similar to the naval aviator tribe in the Navy, because the Air Force institution values what other Services, such as the Army and the Marines, might view as "support" officers. This polar disparity of intra-service hierarchies could cause friction between the Services, with the most likely friction occurring between the Air Force/Navy and the Army/Marine Corps. This unique hierarchy also encourages another cultural attribute that is very different from the non-aviator-focused cultures of the Army and Marines, called rank versus responsibility.

Rank versus Responsibility

The aviator tribal culture is unique and like no other aspect of the Armed Services. Because of its high technology and technical nature, aviation demands that pilots remain technically and academically proficient in their craft. Any deficiency or lack of proficiency often results in catastrophic accidents or death; it is an incredibly demanding and unforgiving trade. All of the Services recognize this fact since their respective organizations all contain professional aviators. However, whereas the Air Force and Navy largely view their aviators as combat leaders, the Army and Marines

[54] Wikipedia, "Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force," http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chief_of_Staff_of_the_United_States_Air_Force (accessed November 29, 2014).

view their aviators as support assets directly enabling their soldiers or riflemen, respectively.[55]

The aviator culture has a different leadership mindset. Aviators require tactical leaders that are technically proficient in the aircraft. However, the officer most technically proficient in the aircraft is frequently junior in rank. This occurs because of the Air Force's professional officer development requirements, which frequently remove senior aviators from their "line" duties and places them in other professional development opportunities or organizational leadership roles. These organizational or academic roles (schools, staff, and other operational non-flying leadership requirements) do not require an aviator to maintain their operational status as an active flyer.[56] This is significant because it means the leader of a multi-seat aircraft, or formation of single-seat fighters, is frequently a junior officer, because he/she is the most technically proficient and current in the aircraft. For example, the captain (O-3) is the most prevalent rank in an Air Force fighter squadron. A captain often leads a four-ship of fighters on a combat mission, where some of his wingmen likely outrank him. For the senior O-4 or O-5 that might be in the formation as a wingman, he follows the orders of the O-3 flight leader, making exceptions only when acting in the role of an instructor (if appropriately qualified), interjecting for safety or to prevent mission failure. In post-flight debriefs, it is the flight leader, the O-3 in this example, that leads the mission debrief and analyzes the performance of his/her wingmen, regardless of their rank, on mission execution and deficiencies. The same is true for multi-seat airlift aircraft, where the pilot-in-command

[55] See the operational examples provided in the historical case studies section of this monograph, which further discusses this rank-versus-responsibility role disparity.

[56] The Army largely avoids this aviator technical proficiency shortfall with its warrant officer program.

is in charge of mission accomplishment, regardless of rank. In short, position, not rank, assigns the responsibility of leadership during tactical missions.

This aspect of aviator sub-culture conditions its aviator officers to be less rank conscious and more conscious of technical capability. This in turn inculcates a more informal interaction between officers of varying ranks within an aviator culture. Certainly, aviators still abide by long-held military customs and courtesies for those that outrank them, but they are less formal and rigid when considering rank as other non-aviator cultures.

The rank-versus-responsibility dynamic becomes more evident when one considers the Army soldier or Marine rifleman. Unlike the aviator culture, the highest-ranking soldier or marine is frequently *the* individual that is leading his formation and responsible for mission success.

This disparity between cultural rank-versus-responsibility can cause friction between the Services, especially for those Services that are not accustomed to a prevalent aviator culture, such as the one found in the Air Force. This service friction is likely to occur between the Air Force/Navy and the Army/Marines. Additionally, intra-service friction due to rank-versus-responsibility disparities likely occurs between the aviators and the non-aviator tribes within the Army, and to a lesser extent, the Marines.

Flexibility

An unofficial motto within the U.S. Air Force is that "flexibility is the key to airpower." A culture of flexibility permeates the Airman culture. In fact, the Air Force

describes one of its core tenants to be flexibility and versatility.[57] Air Force Doctrine Document 1 highlights this focus:

> Airmindedness impacts Airmen's thoughts throughout all phases of operations. It is neither platform- nor situation-specific. Airmindedness enables Airmen to think and act at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war, simultaneously if called for. Thus, the flexibility and utility of airpower is best fully exploited by an air-minded Airman…Broader perspective, greater potential speed and range, and three-dimensional movement fundamentally change the dynamics of conflict in ways not well understood by those bound to the surface. The result is inherent flexibility and versatility based on greater mobility and responsiveness.[58]

The Air Force, and the very nature of the air domain, requires a culture of "flexibility and discretion" (see figure 2). This is significant, because the Air Force culture is the polar opposite of one that is rooted in "stability and control."

In conclusion, the Air Force embodies a culture of independence, technology-focused qualitative superiority, intra-service hierarchies, rank versus responsibility, and flexibility. Whereas the U.S. Air Force is a culture of high-tech warfighters, another U.S. Service takes the opposite approach. The United States Marine Corps instead focuses on the human as the strongest technology of warfare.

[57] The Department of the Air Force, *Air Force Doctrine Document 1* (n.p.: LeMay Center/DDS, 2011), 37.
[58] Ibid., 14, 18, 25.

United States Marine Corps Culture

In the context of joint interactions and based on the author's research, the author classifies the Marine Corps' cultural traits that have the most influence on interactions with the other Services into four categories: "Innovative Thinking Man," Combined-Arms Experts, Institutional Independence, and Minimal Intra-service (Tribal) Hierarchy.

Innovative Thinking Man

The U.S. Marine Corps is an "expeditionary warrior culture."[59] The Corps began as a "naval expeditionary power projection force" in 1775.[60] Today, the Marine Corps is a small, light, mobile, expeditionary, amphibious, combined-arms assault force. The very nature of the Marine Corps being relatively small, relatively low-tech, light, mobile, and an expeditionary assault force, requires officer leaders that are "innovative thinking men."

Marine Corps Doctrine Publication 1 noted, "The military profession is a thinking profession."[61] Finlan noted that the Marine Corps lacks the manpower strength of the U.S. Army, and that the Marines instead place focus on the rifleman rather than the technological advantages of armor or artillery. He concluded, "This suggests that the Marine Corps considers the human element, with all the limitations of the flesh, as the

[59] Norman L. Cooling and Roger B. Turner, "Understanding the Few Good Men: An Analysis of Marine Corps Service Culture," n.p., http://www.darack.com/sawtalosar/USMC-SERVICE-CULTURE.pdf (accessed November 29, 2014), 10.
[60] Ibid., 1.
[61] United States Marine Corps, *MCDP1 - Warfighting*, Marines.mil, http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/MCDP%201%20Warfighting.pdf (accessed December 6, 2014), 57.

most important on the battlefield."[62] Marine Corps doctrine states, "War is a human enterprise and no amount of technology can reduce the human dimension, our philosophy of command must be based on human characteristics rather than on equipment or procedures."[63]

The cultural mixture of limited resources, unique missions, and the nation's elite aura surrounding its Marines, produces expectations of Marines securing victory using innovative means. Cooling and Turner, both retired Marines, noted the American public's expectation for Marines to win the toughest battles using innovation and minimal resources:

> The public believes that Marines guarantee a win every time, and that Marines will die before accepting anything less…Marine leaders also understand that Americans expect them to find a way to accomplish the assigned task, regardless of whether that task is consistent with the Service's formal roles and missions or not…In the course of winning battles with minimal resources, the Corps has developed a well-earned reputation for ingenuity, innovation, and improvisation. Indeed the Service's institutional paranoia, along with its encouragement for frank and open discussion, a large degree of trust between commanders and Marines, and its focus on the human dimensions of warfare, have made innovation an inherent part of its institutional culture.[64]

It is also interesting to note that Cooling and Turner also highlight the Corps' cultural aspect of "encouragement for frank and open discussion." Similar to the obedience disparity discussed in the previous sections of this chapter, this suggests that the Corps expects their Marines to engage in conversations and constructive debate if time permits, not to simply follow orders blindly. Marine Corps doctrine eloquently explains this aspect of their culture:

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[62] Finlan, 51.
[63] USMC, *MCDP1 - Warfighting*, 78.
[64] Cooling and Turner, 6.

> Relations among all leaders--from corporal to general--should be based on honesty and frankness regardless of disparity between grades. Until a commander has reached and stated a decision, subordinates should consider it their duty to provide honest, professional opinions even though these may be in disagreement with the senior's opinions. However, once the decision has been reached, juniors then must support it as if it were their own. Seniors must encourage candor among subordinates and must not hide behind their grade insignia. Ready compliance for the purpose of personal advancement--the behavior of 'yes-men'--will not be tolerated.[65]

The above citation is significant because it closely resembles the previously discussed Air Force culture it two ways. First, it indicates a culture that is relatively less rank conscious. Second, it also indicates a culture that has relatively less restrictive obedience expectations. Combined together, one could conclude that the Corps expects a culture of limited discretion, encouraging honest dialogue rather than total obedience. This is significant because it is contrary to the Army's culture discussed previously, that is one more rank-conscious and with more strict views towards obedience.

If you combine this aspect of "limited discretion" with the leanings toward innovation and flexibility, it is indicative of a culture of "flexibility and discretion," vice "stability and control." Cooling and Turner further highlight the Corps attitude towards flexibility by noting that Marine commanders "resent prescriptive doctrine and retain their prerogative to deviate from it in order to best attain the objective at the least human and material cost."[66]

This "innovative thinking man" cultural trait is significant in that it might cause service friction with Services more focused on stability and control, such as the Army, or with Services that are less resource constrained, such as the Navy or Air Force. Indeed,

[65] USMC, *MCDP1 - Warfighting*, 58.
[66] Cooling and Turner, 7.

the Corps' culture requires every Marine to be a "innovative thinking man" to guarantee success on the battlefield utilizing the unique way that Marines fight--frequently indirect methods of warfare utilizing combined arms.

Combined Arms Experts

While the Army frequently prefers the direct method of warfare utilizing overwhelming firepower, the Corps tends to prefer the indirect method while incorporating combined arms. Cooling and Turner noted that because of the small size of the Corps, Marines tend to be students of Sun Tzu in addition to traditional military theorists, favoring the indirect approach of warfare in order to accomplish their mission.[67] A numerically inferior Marine assault force cannot afford a direct, brute-force, assault on the enemy. Instead, the Corps favors light and agile maneuver warfare. The Corps' emphasis on maneuver applies in time as well as geography, whereby temporal advantages can be just as important as spatial ones.[68] Additionally, because of the Corps' amphibious nature, which includes the perilous task of assaulting land from the sea with a numerically inferior force, Marines must be combined arms experts to succeed. This means that Marines must incorporate direct and indirect fires, such as artillery, naval gunfire, and fixed- and rotary-wing attack platforms, all synchronized with the rapid movement of riflemen to provide them the tactical advantage over a larger and well-defended enemy force. Marine Corps doctrine defines combined arms as "the full integration of arms in such a way that to counteract one, the enemy must become more

[67] Ibid., 2.
[68] USMC, *MCDP1 - Warfighting*, 72.

vulnerable to another…We use each arm for missions that no other arm can perform as well; for example, we assign aviation a task that cannot be performed equally well by artillery."[69]

Not only does the Corps' challenging mission foster Marines with innovative mindsets, it also facilitates Marines well trained in the art of combined arms, expertly integrating joint fires and maneuvers. This cultural trait is significant in the joint context because it naturally produces officers well versed and trained in the art and science of combined arms--a skill critical to the joint force. Cooling and Turner noted, "based on their experience as combined-arms, multi-dimensional MAGTFs [Marine Air-Ground Task Forces] throughout their careers, Marine leaders instinctively understand the logic and synergy behind joint and multinational operations whether they are first on the scene or part of, or leading[,] a joint or multinational force."[70] Cooling and Turner further noted that Marine culture is rooted in being "soldiers from the sea" and that the Marines "considered themselves joint long before 'jointness' came into vogue."[71]

Institutional Independence

Similar to the Air Force, the Marine Corps has a culture focused on institutional independence. The Corps' culture is rooted in its early institutional establishment in 1775, but also in its continued fight for institutional independence and relevance ever since. Cooling and Turner noted, "At several points in its 232 year existence, the Army, the Navy, and even a few Presidents have launched serious campaigns to eliminate or

[69] Ibid., 93-94.
[70] Cooling and Turner, 7.
[71] Ibid., 3.

dramatically reduce the Corps."[72] Cooling and Turner argued that the Corps' success in conducting challenging amphibious operations in the Pacific during World War II, the National Security Act of 1947, the Corps' victories during the Korean War, and its productive "institutional paranoia" on remaining relevant, has fostered an innovative culture motivated to accomplish new roles and missions in the 21st century. They additionally note that the Corps' small size and unique combined-arms mentality also helps solidify the Corps as an institution, yielding further longevity: "larger, naturally more bureaucratic organizations cannot duplicate the Marines' unique institutional warrior culture, born in all mediums of warfare--maritime, land, and air."[73]

The Corps' cultural trait of independence is significant, similar to the Air Forces' independence trait--that is, the Corps would likely resist any joint interactions that challenge the Corps' independent mindset, or have the impression of infringing upon or subjugating their institution. However, the Marine Corps certainly has experience with some aspects of subjugation through the mere fact that the Corps is still heavily reliant upon, and falls bureaucratically under, the Department of the Navy, which causes some of their continued "paranoia" about preserving their institution.

[72] Ibid.
[73] Ibid., 5.

Intra-Service (Tribal) Hierarchy

Unlike the other U.S. Services, the Marine Corps lacks an initial perceptible level of intra-service (tribal) hierarchy. The Corps prides itself in making Marines. Unlike the other Services, who will often say, "I'm in the air force, army, or navy," the rifleman will say that he/she *is a Marine*, not 'in' the Marines. Similarly, the Corps trains all of its Marines to be riflemen--it is not simply a specialty. Cooling and Turner noted, "The Corps trains all of its officers to command a rifle platoon in combat. Consistent with its warrior culture, Marines do not think of themselves as pilots, logisticians, or infantrymen. They are Marines, and they can all fight."[74] Dorn et al. noted, "The Marine Corps has actively discouraged the emergence within the corps of subcultures based on branches or separate war-fighting communities."[75] A specific example of this "anti-tribal" effort is through a seemingly trivial but significant policy whereby the Corps expects all Marines to wear the same utility uniform, typically allowing their Marine aviators to wear flight suits only on the days in which they are actively conducting flying operations.

The Corps seemingly discourages discrimination based on operational specialties, instead striving to make all Marines riflemen, and of equal stature. However, similar to the other Services, some would argue that the Corps promotes what it values. Until recently, the senior most Marine, the Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps, has been a rifleman despite almost a century of Marine Corps aviation. In October 2010, General

[74] Ibid., 8.
[75] Edwin Dorn et al., *American Military Culture in the Twenty-First Century* (Washington DC: CSIS International Security Program, 2000), 13.

James Amos became the first Marine aviator to hold the Corps' highest position of leadership.[76]

Despite Marine Corps doctrinal claims of solidarity, and that of Cooling and Turner, perhaps it would be fair to say that intra-service hierarchy within the Corps is minimal, but not eliminated altogether; one cannot ignore the promotion disparity to the Corps' highest position, the Commandant of the Marine Corps. However, should the Corps' claim of solidarity be true, it is unique among the U.S. Armed Services and significant in that it implies that a Marine officer is least likely to display any conscious or subconscious preferential treatment towards joint warfighters, regardless of their operational specialty. This also implies that the Marine officer would likely be indifferent towards the distinction of "combat" versus "support" personnel within the Corps since every Marine is a "rifleman." Additionally, this unbiased, "purist" viewpoint towards specialty, combat, and support tribes, would likely result in less service friction between the Corps and the other Services during joint interactions. Contrarily, the mere fact that a Marine aviator rose to the Corps' highest position could be proof in and of itself that the Corps views all Marines as equal. In summary, perhaps the fact that all Commandants have been riflemen, with the exception of one aviator, indicates that the Marine Corps, similar to the Army, does value their riflemen over their "support" officers, but to a much lesser extent.

[76] Kevin Baron, "Colors passed, Gen. James Amos becomes 35th commandant of the USMC," *Stripes.com*, October 22, 2010, http://www.stripes.com/blogs/stripes-central/stripes-central-1.8040/colors-passed-gen-james-amos-becomes-35th-commandant-of-the-u-s-marine-corps-1.122690 (accessed December 7, 2014).

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CHAPTER 3

Historical Case Studies

Studying military culture is challenging because the sheer breadth of the variables involved requires a multidisciplinary approach in order to interrogate the various causal factors and pathways that determine the scope and outlook of a particular military institution.

-- Alastair Finlan, *Contemporary Military Culture and Strategic Studies*

Chapter 2 provided a literature review on service culture, highlighting the key cultural traits of each of the Services that are most likely to influence joint interactions. This chapter will attempt to "operationalize" the examination of service culture and its historical impact to military operations, thereby highlighting how service culture can produce service friction during joint interactions and operations. Operation Eagle Claw and Operation Anaconda will be used as the two case studies for this examination. It is not all-inclusive, and others examining these two operations will certainly find additional service culture aspects. Although this chapter will only review two case studies, the author challenges any future researchers to examine other joint operations--service culture impacts most assuredly exist in all of them.

Operation EAGLE CLAW

In April 1980, the Joint Chiefs of Staff formed a Joint Task Force (JTF), led by Army Major General James Vaught, to plan and execute a rescue of American hostages held in Tehran. The JTF consisted of Army Delta Force and Rangers, Air Force fixed-wing transport aircraft, gunships, and combat controllers, and Marine and Navy aircrew flying Navy rotary-wing aircraft. The operation was an incredibly bold, complex, multi-day rescue mission, heavily reliant upon rotary-wing and fixed-wing transport aircraft flying across Iran, and reliant upon strict operational security to be successful. Unfortunately, Vaught had to abort the mission because of a mixture of bad weather, helicopter maintenance issues, and poor operational command, control, and communications, which all culminated in a deadly crash at the Desert One refueling site. The Holloway Report, which was a rescue mission report to "recommend improvements in planning, organizing, coordinating, directing, and controlling any such operations in the future,"[1] found that one of the major issues during the operation was the JTF's organization, and command and control.

Conflicting Intra-Service Hierarchies (Combat vs. Support)

The Holloway report noted that "task organization planning, integration of concurrent planning by subordinate units, and determination of support and requirements, were compartmentalized and reliant upon *ad hoc* arrangements."[2] Additionally, informal

[1] James L. Holloway, *Rescue Mission Report* (Washington, DC: Special Operations Review Group, 1980), 2.
[2] Ibid., 15.

ad hoc command relationships plagued the JTF. First, the Joint Chiefs of Staff appointed Maj. Gen. Gast (USAF) as a special consultant to Maj. Gen. Vaught because of his recent experience during a tour in Iran. Gast was not officially appointed as the deputy JTF commander until 12 April, 1980, only twelve days prior to execution of the rescue mission.

Second, the helicopter task force lacked official leadership. The Holloway report noted:

> The senior Marine officer [Col. Pittman] involved in the operation was assigned to the Office of the CJCS and, while not officially designated a member of the JTF staff, became involved in mission planning and execution. At the direction of the Director of Operations, Joint Staff [USMC General Shutler], he reviewed the early November helicopter planning, examined the aircrew selection against special mission requirements, arranged for the assignment of more experienced pilots, assessed the helicopter force training effort, and planned the movement of the unit to the western United States desert training site. During this period, it was implied that this officer was in charge of the helicopter force during the preparation phase, and he believed this to be so. However, the COMJTF may have thought differently, and it was evident throughout the first two months of training that much (if not all) of the COMJTF direction of effort concerning helicopter preparation and special mission capability was done through the general officer [Gast] who was thought to be the consultant on Iran. In mid-January 1980, the role of the senior Marine [Col. Pittman] had evolved into that of overall helicopter force leader, since no other designation had been made, and, at his request, he began to attend the COMJTF planning meetings.[3]

Third, the report noted that Colonel Kyle, USAF, was the "Deputy COMJTF/Air Component Commander," but noted that his role evolved into the "task of supervising and coordinating the C-130 training." The report later changes his title to "Deputy/COMJTF/*Air Force* Component Commander." Additionally, just prior to

[3] Ibid., 15-16.

mission execution, Vaught assigned Kyle as 'on-scene' commander for Desert One, responsible for supervising the refueling of aircraft and helicopters.[4]

The report's findings are significant for a couple of reasons. The trend was that air force and marine aviators were not *formally* assigned leadership roles until late in the organization and planning process; two and a half months late in the case for Col. Pitman, and five months late for Maj. Gen. Gast. Obviously, clear chains of command are imperative to military missions. The air component chain of command is no different. Gen. Vaught was dual-hatted as the commander of the JTF and the Ground Component Commander, which gave him the authority to command and control all ground forces, regardless of Service affiliation.[5] Yet, the air component lacked similar official command authority. There was no officially designated air component commander, responsible for the command, control, organizing, planning, training, and employment of the air force and marine components. Col. Kyle agreed, "Air Force and Marine component commanders each directed their own flying operations and reported directly to General Vaught. In hindsight, this failed to produce the coordination necessary to provide a cohesive, well-orchestrated flying operation. The JTF should have appointed one individual as the single authority for directing flight operations. This could have prevented such errors as the discarding of the secure radio components, last-minute tactics changes, and reliance on erroneous intelligence data."[6]

Gen. Gast was the "consultant on Iran" but was occasionally providing guidance for the air operations. Yet, as noted earlier, Col. Pitman was the ad hoc helicopter

[4] Ibid., 16.
[5] Ibid., 17.
[6] James H. Kyle, *The Guts to Try* (New York: Orion Books, 1990), 332.

component lead, and had to *ask for permission* to attend planning meetings. With this ad hoc arrangement, it is very possible that there were times when Col Kyle thought he was supposed to plan and coordinate; times when Gen. Gast would provide guidance as a "consultant"; and times when helicopter planning was lacking until Col. Pitman engaged, partly because of the JCS/J3's direction, who was likely anticipating the train wreck. A more specific example of the operational impact occurred during the refueling at Desert One when "marine pilots questioned orders to abandon their helicopters because they did not even know that air force [sic] Colonel Kyle was the site commander."[7]

Another tactical error further validated the absence of consolidated air component leadership, this time due to the Marine Corps' cultural attribute of austerity, which tends to resist new technology. Planners in DC imposed strict communication security on the aviation elements. Ryan noted, "Those who made the decisions for the rescue may have been ignorant of current communications technology."[8] Although the fixed-wing crews could work around the radio security restrictions with their secure radio equipment, the Marines elected other low-tech options. Kyle noted the issue when he brought it up to a Marine aviator in the planning phase:

> I argued that problems, serious but not requiring immediacy, could arise that might be solved through use of the secure radios without compromising the mission. I pressed my point. "How do you plan to coordinate any in-flight messages you might receive over the command net?" "By hand signals and flashlight Morse code," Ed answered. I blinked at that. "What if we have to talk to you from the C-130s?" "Over the satellite radio," was his reply. "Then I can relay the information to the rest of my formation by hand or light signals." I could see that I hadn't convinced them, even though they yielded to my arguments at the time.[9]

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[7] Paul B. Ryan, *The Iranian Rescue Mission: Why it Failed* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1985), 118.
[8] Ibid., 123.
[9] Kyle, 162.

Prior to execution, the Marine crews did indeed remove their secure inter-aircraft radio components from their Navy helicopters, which removed their capability to communicate with the rest of the air component via secure voice. Instead, the Marines used flashing lights of Morse code.[10] This is significant, because it highlights the Marine's minimalist and sometimes technology-phobic culture. This had a significant impact during execution when weather complicated the mission. The lead helicopter landed in the Iranian desert after encountering the first Haboob (wall of dust), and a second helicopter carrying Col. Pitman, the helicopter component commander, returned to the aircraft carrier because of an electrical problem. Although the flight leader in helicopter number one was able to eventually continue to Desert One after its tactical pause at an intermediate landing site, the rest of the Marine air component had to press on to Desert One without their flight leader or component leader, none of which was communicated at the time. This had a significant impact on the helicopter component of the operation. Similar to ground combat, losing your leaders early in a mission affects confidence and effectiveness. Lastly, and more importantly, a single air component commander would have likely not allowed this communication gap to occur in the first place and would have instead mandated secure radio capabilities for the entire task force.

Additionally, an air component commander could have addressed the differences between the fixed and the rotary-wing assets, such as mandating that the helicopter pilots fly at the same altitude as the C-130s, since the C-130s radar cross-section was likely greater than or similar to the RH-53s. Alternatively, the air component could have explored options to use C-130 pathfinders to lead the helicopters into the Desert One site

[10] Ibid., 330.

in case of bad weather. Specifically, under the benefit of hindsight, a one-star general should have been appointed to serve as the air component commander, with Col. Kyle designated as the fixed-wing component commander and Col. Pitman designated as the rotary-wing component commander, both reporting to the air component commander.[11]

All of this begs the question: Why did Gen. Vaught fail to assign formal leadership roles for the aviator leaders of his task force? Was it simply an oversight, or did Vaught's Army culture background bias him to see aviators as merely "support" assets that would be there when and where he needed them? Did he underestimate the complexity of the task force's mission and not place appropriate emphasis on his air component by formalizing the component's chain of command and ensuring it had unity of effort? Although inconclusive without General Vaught's insights, it appears that the "combat versus support disparity," formed through conflicting inter-service (tribal) hierarchies, may have had an influence on the JTF commander's view towards aviator leaders.

Furthermore, it is worth considering if the results would have been any different had an aviator general been the JTF commander. Traditionally, the CJCS or Combatant Commander selects the JTF commander based on the Service that he/she anticipates to have the preponderance of forces in execution. Instead, had the JCS anticipated the complexity of the operation which would require a complex air component to be successful, would they have considered selecting an officer with an aviation background to lead the joint task force? Paul Ryan, the author of *The Iranian Rescue Mission*, noted

[11] In fairness, it is important to note that the concept of a Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) was a new concept that the CJCS was considering at the time. However, ten years later and after the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, the JFACC concept was used for the first time with great success during Desert Storm.

the success of Air Force Lt. Gen. Manor, who in 1970 was the JTF commander for the Son Tay rescue mission in North Vietnam. Although the JTF failed to rescue the U.S. POWs because they had been transferred to another site, the operation "was so technically well executed that, some said, it had served as a model for the Israeli rescue at Entebbe."[12]

It is interesting to note that another decade later, the same "dismissal" of utilizing an aviator in a leadership role occurred yet again with Army General Norman Schwarzkopf, the Joint Force Commander (JFC) for Desert Storm. General Buster Glosson summarized the event best in his book:

> I had also learned around this time that Schwarzkopf had decided to appoint as his deputy a three-star army general. What had happened to "jointness?" I didn't really care if they made the deputy a Navy admiral with air experience or an Air Force person; I could even have accepted a Marine airman, but I could not accept the fact he put a ground Army guy in as deputy. It was just absolutely a mockery of joint operations.[13]

The decision was a missed opportunity for Schwarzkopf--a slap in the face to the air component that would help deliver the decisive advantage the ground forces would need to defeat an Iraqi army who outnumbered them two to one, and do it in one hundred hours.[14] JFCs must be aware of, and guard against, the combat-versus-support disparity. Aviators, regardless of Service affiliation, are fully capable officers deserving of joint leadership positions.[15]

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[12] Ryan, 110.
[13] Buster Glosson, *War with Iraq: Critical Lessons* (Charlotte: Glosson Family Foundation, 2003), 74.
[14] Ibid., 78.
[15] The author examined General Schwarzkopf's autobiography, *It Doesn't Take a Hero*, to seek any explanation from Schwarzkopf on his decision calculus for selecting his deputy commander. He failed to offer any insight.

Rank-Responsibility Disparity and Trust Disparity

In early December, 1979, an interesting event occurred in the Arizona desert as the JTF was exploring options to air drop multiple 500-gallon blivets (fuel bladders) from two MC-130 aircraft to support refueling operations at Desert One. General Vaught brought in one of his longtime associates, Colonel Foley, who was an airborne-qualified infantryman, to "take charge of the aerial delivery loading and rigging."[16] Colonel Foley had helped develop a container delivery system that would be loaded into the MC-130s to facilitate the first-ever airdrop delivery of the fuel bladders. Foley's soldiers attempted to rig the fuel bladder delivery systems, despite the normal practice of appropriately trained Air Force loadmasters loading their own MC-130s for airdrop cargo. Air Force Sergeants Wiley and Sanchez were concerned. They felt that the fuel bladders from each aircraft would roll out too fast and result in collapsed parachutes upon delivery. "This sparked a spirited debate over the rigging setup, but Wiley finally yielded to Foley's purported extensive experience in such matters and both MC-130s were configured to Army specifications."[17]

A little while later, Air Force Major John Carney had problems with Army Colonel Charlie Beckwith. Carney had problems convincing Colonel Beckwith that he had aligned the airdrop beacons correctly. As an Air Force Combat Controller with over a decade of mission experience, Carney's core mission specialty is setting up austere landing strips to support covert aircraft landings or airdrops. Unknown to Carney at the time, Beckwith was feeling uncomfortable with the pending airdrop. Beckwith noted:

[16] Kyle, 77.
[17] Ibid., 94.

> I took one look at the row of parked RH-53Ds and the map showing the path the C-130 aircraft were taking and knew we had trouble. I asked General Gast if he'd let me be responsible for the drop, a request he happily acceded to…If the C-130s maintained their original track, they'd fly on an axis directly over the parked choppers. Any malfunction in the drop and the blivets from the aircraft would wipe out one or all of the Sea Stallions.
>
> The approach lane was changed by radio and the C-130s banked in a half circle and came in at a ninety-degree angle to the helos.[18]

Despite Carney's expertise, Beckwith's men started setting up the airdrop beacons and ground marker panels in the wrong positions.[19] Carney was eventually able to get them to position the equipment properly, but the beacon ended up pointed in the wrong direction and the C-130s never received the signal. "Even though John's [Carney] sole purpose was to teach Delta how to set up the drop zone, Charlie seemed to be questioning his advice at every turn."[20]

Despite the beacon pointed in the wrong direction, the Air Force MC-130 crews were still able to find the drop zone. However, the "bladders left the first aircraft in less than five seconds. The Army rigging that Duke Wiley and Taco Sanchez had questioned did just what they feared it would--it was a bomb."[21] The next day, after the Air Force

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[18] Charlie A. Beckwith and Donald Knox, *Delta Force* (New York, NY: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1983), 230.

[19] Despite Beckwith's best intentions, he was likely in error. This author has extensive experience with Close Air Support. When delivering ordnance in close proximity to friendly forces, the standard procedure is to employ ordnance *parallel and offset* to friendlies. Employing ordnance *perpendicular* to friendly forces increases the odds of endangering friendly forces should weapons fall long or short of the intended impact point. Therefore, the airdrop procedures used by Major Carney and his Air Force C-130 crews were likely to deliver the fuel bladders from a *parallel and offset* position at a safe distance from friendlies (the helicopters and troops). Their parachute airdrop delivery procedures would also account for wind drift as well to hit their planned drop zone, while ensuring the friendly position was upwind from the planned drop zone such that the wind effect on the airdrop would push the cargo away from friendlies and not towards them. Unbeknownst to Beckwith, his last minute change of axis most assuredly posed increased risk to his forces, despite ten of the twelve fuel blivets falling ballistically due to Colonel Foley's parachute delivery rigging errors. This is another example of the "trust disparity" negatively influencing joint operations.

[20] Kyle, 95.

[21] Ibid.

loadmasters came up with a new method to rig the fuel bladders, the "second night's airdrop went off without a hitch."[22] Although Beckwith was apparently unaware of his mistake on changing the airdrop axis (see footnote 19), he did acknowledge his team's rigging mistake in his book:

> These huge blivets burst on impact like ripe pumpkins dropped from a twenty-story building. It was like striking oil. And it was a disaster. An investigation showed the Army parachute riggers had improperly loaded the blivets. There was enough embarrassment to go around for everyone to share. A lot of experimentation followed. The next rehearsal ran smoothly and the blivets landed softly and intact.[23]

These joint interactions between Air Force personnel who are junior to higher-ranked Army officers are significant in two ways. First, it highlights an apparent rank-responsibility disparity. Second, it highlights a disparity of trust.

Air Force loadmasters are the experts of their airframe. If qualified personnel existed to supervise the installation of the container delivery system for the fuel bladder delivery, it was the two Air Force sergeants. Did the Army colonel and his men assume that the Air Force sergeants were too junior in rank and not capable of accomplishing the task? Were they looking at the Airmen as the equivalent of an Army squad leader? Were they looking at the Airmen as simply "support" assets that needed managing similar to Army support assets? Was the Army culture of "stability and control" more to blame? Thomas Ricks, author of the book titled *The Generals*, noted that despite the Army's attempts to change their leadership culture through advanced strategic schools, "generalship tended to remain the same in the 1980s and '90s as in earlier decades. Most

[22] Ibid., 96.
[23] Beckwith, 230.

notably, the complaints about micromanagement by senior officers that plagued the Army in the 1950s and '60s would continue into the rebuilt Army of the 1980s and '90s."[24]

However, it is possible that the rigging interaction was a disparity of trust between the Services. The Air Force service culture biases more towards "trust, but verify." This occurs because of the centralized control and decentralized execution mindset of the Air Force, the highly technical specialties, and the large geographically-separated spaces that the Service transverses. For example, Airmen frequently conduct very complex operations in flight, in close proximity to other aircraft, and sometimes without ever meeting their fellow comrades. For Airmen in training and in combat, trust is often assumed, not necessarily earned--but it can be lost. Airmen expect other Airmen to be professionals, to know their job, and to be experts in their craft; the high-tech nature of their professions demands nothing less. For example, during large air campaigns, such as those conducted in Desert Storm and large exercises such as Red Flag, aviators fly in large air packages consisting of over a hundred aircraft and several hundred aircrew, all executing different but complementary missions. Although desired, geography frequently restricts in-person briefs and debriefs from occurring. Therefore, aviators frequently plan and execute complex missions with strangers, and they excel at it, because they trust that their fellow aviators will execute professionally.

In contrast, the Army's "stability and control" culture creates a bias towards trust that first must be earned or proven. Ricks noted that an internal Army study conducted in 1987 noted that 48% of the 141 senior Army sergeants surveyed cited that their officers did not inspire trust and confidence. Ricks further noted:

[24] Thomas E. Ricks, *The Generals: American Military Command from World War II to Today* (Waterville ME: Thorndike Press, 2012), 359.

> There is an inverse relationship between trust and micromanagement. The more one trusts subordinates, even to the point of allowing them to make their own corrections after erring, the less necessary it is to hover over them. Lack of trust has corrosive effects within organizations, slowing them down and cramping their ability to move information quickly, adjust to new circumstances, or engage in prudent risk taking. "Not trusting people is an invitation to organizational disaster," Lt. Gen. Walter Ulmer Jr., the Army's foremost expert on leadership at the time, warned in 1986.[25]

The same rank-responsibility and trust disparities plagued the relationship between Colonel Beckwith and Major Carney. Colonel Beckwith's gut reaction not to trust the Air Force major to do his job was likely an aspect of rank-responsibility disparity and one of a trust disparity as well. All too often, this type of disparity causes pre-mature intervention and/or meddling that is not necessary, often adds friction to the joint operation, and sometimes results in failure, which is unfairly placed on one service's performance that in reality was negatively impacted by the other service's meddling.

Micromanagement is not a new challenge for the Army and has been repeatedly studied and confirmed. Ricks noted:

> When the Army Command and General Staff College surveyed officers in 1995, it found the same concerns that had been reported in the Army War College's 1970 *Study on Military Professionalism*. "The overcontrolling leader and the micromanager remain alive and well in the Army today," retired Army Col. Lloyd Matthews wrote in 1996, in a statement that was greeted as uncontroversial. A year later, retired Maj. Gen. John Faith wrote an article bewailing military micromanagement that was essentially no different from the articles in *Military Review* four decades earlier.[26]

Unfortunately, another example of micromanagement occurred when Major General Vaught got involved with the desert training the week following the airdrop. He decided to observe first-hand the blacked-out landing of the MC-130s as they were

[25] Ibid., 359-360.
[26] Ibid., 390-391.

training for the upcoming operation. The aircrews were still adjusting to the relatively new technology of night vision googles (NVGs) and the brand new tactic of conducting blacked-out landings with no runway lights and no aircraft external lighting. On the moonless night, Vaught decided to stand behind one of the C-130 co-pilot's seat as the aircrew attempted their approach and landing. The aircraft landed hard and the general hit his voice box on the co-pilot's headrest. After the flight, Kyle noted, "after we landed and got off the aircraft, he let me know in no uncertain terms that the landings had to get smoother. On top of this, he told me there were still too many lights on inside the plane--blacked-out meant just that! Was he mad!"[27]

The hard landing certainly validated some of General Vaught's lack of trust in the aircrew. However, having an Army two-star general in the cockpit to watch the crew land is not quite an Air Force standard operating procedure either. Furthermore, an Army soldier dictating aircraft cockpit lighting is micromanagement and un-executable, tantamount to mandating soldiers to drive their Humvees while wearing blindfolds.

In conclusion, Operation EAGLE CLAW was a bold, valiant effort made by noble men doing the best that they could to succeed under extremely difficult conditions. However, there was significant service culture friction, created by conflicting inter-service hierarchies, rank-responsibility disparities, and trust disparities, that complicated an already complicated mission. A decade later, the joint team would excel during Operation DESERT STORM. However, another decade later, two of the Services would again have significant service culture friction during Operation ANACONDA.

[27] Kyle, 103.

Operation ANACONDA

In October 2001, the early phases of Operation Enduring Freedom began as a war with U.S. and coalition Special Forces, working with Northern Alliance tribal warlords while utilizing support from American airpower to route the Taliban. The operation was a joint one. In November, two Marine Expeditionary Units deployed into southwest Afghanistan to establish an austere logistical base for the purpose of broadening the hunt for Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden.[28] In February 2002, planning for Operation Anaconda began and the special force's Task Force Dagger handed over planning to the U.S. Army's 10th Mountain Division, later joined by elements from the 101st Airborne Division.[29] This marked a transition in the operation from a predominantly special-warfare led operation to a more conventional one. The mission of Operation Anaconda was to trap and destroy enemy forces in the Shahi Kot valley in eastern Afghanistan. Initial estimates on enemy strength were underestimated and adequate coordination with the air component during the Special Forces to conventional forces transition was lacking. Nevertheless, despite significant joint friction, the battle of Anaconda lasted just two weeks and the coalition forces ultimately defeated the enemy. Despite the "win," the battle lacked adequate joint command and control architecture, and adequate joint planning.

[28] Mark G. Davis, "Operation Anaconda: Command and Confusion in Joint Warfare" (master's thesis, School of Advance Airpower Studies, Air University, 2004), 64.
[29] Edgar Fleri, "Operation Anaconda Case Study," Air University, http://www.au.af.mil/au/aul/school/awc/electives/6543_operationanaconda.pdf (accessed December 20, 2014), 34.

Similar to Operation Eagle Claw, Anaconda had challenges with ad hoc command and control (C2) architectures, but at the operational level of war. Commanders had to prioritize the limited assets that they brought to the theater because of SECDEF- and CENTCOM-imposed deployment footprints.[30] The relatively small footprint of Special Operation Forces, decentralized operations in Afghanistan, and the commensurate fewer air support requirements, drove an air control requirement that permitted a more ad hoc command and control arrangement than would otherwise be utilized during conventional warfare. However, the same ad hoc C2 that was sufficient for the air war over Afghanistan to support unconventional special operations was woefully inadequate for a centralized conventional battle over fourteen days in a small Afghan valley. The saturated airspace that came along with a conventional land battle demanded a more robust C2 architecture. The Theater Air Control System/Army Air-Ground System (TACS-AAGS), as outlined in Joint Publication 3-09.3, is a conventional, combat-proven, C2 architecture utilized to effectively and efficiently coordinate, command, and control all air support requirements for joint and coalition ground forces. It contains hierarchical Air Force and Army C2 nodes to accomplish its task. However, during the planning and execution of Anaconda, some of those C2 nodes were missing, namely the Air Support Operations Center (ASOC) and the Division Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) for the 10th Mountain Division.

The ASOC's role in the TACS-AAGS architecture is to be the senior C2 element for the coordination, command, control, and vetting of close air support in the area of

[30] Thomas E. Ricks, *The Generals: American Military Command from World War II to Today* (Waterville ME: Thorndike Press, 2012), 399.

responsibility. In order to provide good synergy for the soldiers it supports, the Air Force normally deploys the ASOC forward to collocate with an Army Corps or Division. Prior to March 2002, the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC), located in Saudi Arabia, was subsuming the role of the absent ASOC. Again, this worked well for the unconventional warfare fight, but not for the conventional one--the CAOC simply did not have the situational awareness, trained personnel, undiluted focus, or the joint presence that comes with an ASOC collocated in a Joint Operations Center.

Despite the deficiency, the lack of an ASOC was a solvable problem. In fact, on February 20, in the process of making ad hoc adjustments from lackluster joint planning and coordination, the Air Force began efforts to attempt setting up an ASOC cell to support the operation at Bagram, Afghanistan, unfortunately just as the Task Force published its Operations Order.[31] However, with enough warning, the Air Force could have deployed a full ASOC to Afghanistan with the arrival of conventional forces.[32] Nevertheless, a working-level relationship between the Combined Forces Air Component Commander (CFACC) and the Combined Forces Land Component Commander (CFLCC) was non-existent before Anaconda preparation. An Air Force report noted:

> Component commanders were in regular contact. However, the working-level relationships did not blossom. According to a later CFLCC report, the CFLCC's daily synchronization video teleconferences (VTCs) that began in November 2001 did not include "formal CFACC representation" until mid-to-late February 2002. The [Battlefield Coordination Detachment, Special Operations Liaison Element], and Marine Corps liaison officer (MARLO) representatives [from the CAOC] participated in the VTCs. However, this coordination did not necessarily ensure that word of major

[31] Headquarters United States Air Force, AF/XOL, *Operation Anaconda: An Air Power Perspective*, Task Force Enduring Look Report, Department of the Air Force (Washington DC, 2005), 52.

[32] In fact, coordination with the Air Force could have been initiated with the release of the CFLCC's warning order that occurred on January 6, 2002, which provided initial planning guidance for operations in the area with an estimated 700-2100 enemy troops. Fleri, pg. 34.

> impending operations would reach the CFACC or his chief subordinates in time for them to complete full planning.[33]

Relationships between the Division commander and his Air Force element were not much better. The Combined Task Force Commander was Army Maj. Gen. Hagenbeck, the 10th Mountain Division commander. The 10th Mountain Division deployed without bringing their home-station TACP support.[34] Although the division's battalions did bring their TACPs, the TACP elements above battalion-level were missing.[35] This meant that the conventional TACP C2 elements that would traditionally integrate into the brigade and division staff for planning, integration, and C2, in order to provide air support for the ground commander's scheme of maneuver during Anaconda, was noticeably absent. This joint planning oversight resulted in the Air Force scrambling ten days prior to the planned operation to pull together an ad hoc C2 element from existing in-theater resources.[36]

In defense of the 10th Mountain Division, it originally deployed in October 2001 with a force protection mission in Uzbekistan. To keep the footprint small, the division had to make tough decisions on what they would take and what they would leave behind. The 18th Air Support Operations Commander, USAF Colonel Michael Longoria, recalled:

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[33] HQ USAF, *Operation Anaconda*, 48.

[34] USAF TACP units are stationed at Army posts worldwide. USAF Air Support Operations Squadrons, and their TACP personnel (Air Liaison Officers, Enlisted Terminal Air Controllers, Combat Weather, and C2 maintenance personnel), have been collocated with the Army soldiers that they support for well over three decades. The USAF started stationing their TACP personnel on Army Posts to build better trust and relationships with the Soldiers that the Airmen are dedicated to support.

[35] Steve Call, *Danger Close: Tactical Air Controllers in Afghanistan and Iraq* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2007), 59.

[36] Fleri, 34.

> Originally they did not take their TACPs that are normally embedded and lived with them at 10th Mountain. We argued that they made a big mistake. I personally told General Hagenbeck it was a big mistake. He took more air defense. I said, 'Sir, the only people I am aware that you are going to shoot down,' I said, will be those aircraft that say 'United States Air Force, United States Navy on the tail.'[37]

On the surface, this decision appears to indicate a misunderstanding of the operational environment. The decision to bring air defense assets while leaving behind the division's sole ability to coordinate, plan, and control offensive or defensive air strikes seems to disregard the fact that the standard U.S. air campaign would garner air superiority in the opening portion of the war, well before Army soldiers would even arrive. Steve Call, author of *Danger Close*, noted his repeated attempts to query General Hagenbeck for his rationale on why he deployed without his Division or Brigade TACPs:

> Operation Anaconda has become a lightning rod of controversy, and General Hagenbeck has been at the center of that controversy from the start. For this reason I felt compelled to give him the chance to respond to accusations made by others against him…General Hagenbeck stated flatly that 10th Mountain's battalions brought their ALOs and ETACs, but he offered no details and made no attempt to explain or counter the points raised by others as I had asked.[38]

As if the change from the force protection mission was not enough, Hagenbeck's post-deployment planning challenges did not get any easier. "Within a period of less than a week [13-22 February], Maj Gen Hagenbeck's headquarters was redesignated a JTF, assumed responsibility for a major combat operation involving ten coalition partners, and relocated an entire headquarters [from Karshi Khanabad, Uzbekistan] to Bagram. All of this added additional complexity that would not have otherwise been

[37] HQ USAF, *Operation Anaconda*, 52.
[38] Call, 59.

present and certainly affected the planning of Anaconda."[39] In addition to Hagenbeck's dynamic situation, the resulting lack of the doctrinal C2 nodes such as the ASOC and the division TACP certainly had a negative effect on the C2 operations during execution. Additionally, it had an equally negative impact on the division's ability to conduct joint planning.

The joint planning for Anaconda was inadequate. One might say that the quality of planning accomplished is a matter of where one sits. General Franks, the CENTCOM commander at the time, stated that he "thought it was a very successful operation…I thought the planning that was done was very good planning, and I think the result of the operation was also outstanding."[40] The CAOC provided a different perspective, "the task of coordination with the air component was difficult from the outset--not because there was resistance, but because word of the operation traveled slowly from the [CFLCC-Forward] planners at Bagram to the air component headquartered at Prince Sultan Air Base, Saudi Arabia."[41] The Air Force report cited that late notification and insufficient coordination between the land and air component at all levels was a problem--the air component "did not bring its full planning resources to bear until the last week of [February]."[42] Lt. General Mosely, the CFACC, lamented, "If you exclude a component from the planning and you exclude a component that will provide the preponderance of support, logistic and kinetic, then you will have to live with the outcome of this not playing out very well."[43] Sean Naylor, author of *Not a Good Day to Die*, noted Air Force

[39] Davis, 74.
[40] Ricks, 399.
[41] HQ USAF, *Operation Anaconda*, 35.
[42] Ibid., 114.
[43] General Michael Moseley, TFEL Interview (January 14, 2003).

Major Donnelly's frustrations as well as he attempted to coordinate with the 10th Mountain staff at Bagram:

> "It was designed as a boots-on-the ground operation, vice an intense air operation with ground support," he said. "It definitely wasn't a top priority [of the planners] to talk to the air planners and discuss what we're going to need." Coordination with the Air Force appeared to be done "almost as an afterthought." Even though Bentley had called Kuwait eleven days before D-Day to request Air Force assistance, Donnelly viewed the Mountain staff's attitude as one of "Oh by the way, we might need some air support."[44]

The Air Force report further supported Donnelly's perception by noting that the problem between the air and land component was more than just a friction between the CFLCC, Lt. General Mikolashek, and the CFACC, but was widespread, affecting all levels of the joint organization, especially the staffs:

> Much of the problem seemed to stem from the lack of clear and frequent contact between the right elements of the staffs of the two components. For example, CFLCC General Mikolashek asked about air component involvement as soon as he was briefed on the plan on 17 February 2002, but working-level contacts did not happen for three more days. Tardy notification to the air component affected fire support planning and execution, and made it a challenge to fulfill airlift requirements for combat forces. As General Moseley later told General Franks: "We shouldn't go into this thinking that the air component's going to come in like the cavalry and bail everybody out. We should have all of this happen at the beginning."[45]

This deficiency in communication inhibited the air component's deliberate planning. The Air Force report notes several operational issues that the air component could have adjusted if they would have had more time to plan. Specifically, the CFACC could have considered adjustments to the air component plan. These include conducting airborne

[44] Sean Naylor, *Not a Good Day to Die* (New York, NY: The Berkley Publishing Group, 2005), 134.
[45] HQ USAF, *Operation Anaconda*, 114.

intelligence of the battlefield to recon enemy force posture in the valley; developing better airspace deconfliction plans for a tight operating area with saturated airspace; coordinating for more permissive and effective rules of engagement; forward deploying the A-10s; and utilizing forward air controllers to expedite targeting while maximizing safety deconfliction.[46]

Grau and Billingsley authored the book titled, *Operation Anaconda: America's First Major Battle in Afghanistan*, which provides an exhaustive chronology of the battle events. They concluded:

> Anaconda was not won by airpower. Anaconda was not won by ground power. Anaconda was not won by special operations forces. Anaconda was won by the combined efforts of American armed forces, Afghan ground forces, Canadian light infantry, and Special Forces from a variety of nations. It was a pickup fight that was inelegant and started off badly, but training, goodwill, and professionalism pulled the operation together.[47]

The Air Force report concluded with similar comments, noting the planning friction:

> What was lacking was a free and full exchange of information about upcoming operations. This can be attributed in part to culture--the land component's general expectation of being 'supported'…[Anaconda] was a case of superior performance from soldiers, Special Forces, and Airmen overriding the shortcomings of prior planning and the serious failures of communication between the components.[48]

[46] Ibid.
[47] Lester W. Grau and Dodge Billingsley, *Operation Anaconda: America's First Major Battle in Afghanistan* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2011), 343.
[48] HQ USAF, *Operation Anaconda*, 118-119.

Conflicting Intra-Service Hierarchies (Combat vs. Support)

The Air Force report noting the "land component's expectation of being 'supported' is telling. This is part of the *Combat versus Support* service-culture friction, as discussed previously in Chapter 2, caused by the dichotomy between intra-service hierarchies that affect the relationships and interactions of service personnel. Most of the operational friction that occurred during Anaconda boiled down to insufficient joint planning. The inadequate joint planning that plagued Anaconda speaks to the importance of information conveyance to the right joint leaders at the right time, of which is predicated on the establishment from the outset of strong joint relationships between joint peers. Joint leaders must build joint relationships on the foundation of parity--based on mutual respect, not on service-biased perceptions of "combat" personnel versus "support" personnel, or "supported" and "supporting." In joint context, supported and supporting define organizational roles and priority of effort. However, it should not translate to superior and inferior, nor inconsiderate disregard for fellow joint warfighters.

Davis had several significant findings in his thesis:

> …evidence shows that most of the coordination between the air and land component occurred after 20 February. Although the CAOC could have participated and had access to the information via message traffic and VTC, it was never "officially" invited to participate in VTCs until the final 26 February operations order brief to General Franks…The fact remains that the CAOC had access to Anaconda information through message traffic and VTC; however it is also true that neither Lt Gen Mikolashek nor Maj Gen Hagenbeck did enough to integrate the CAOC during the critical planning period of 13-20 February. At a minimum, they should have personally contacted Lt Gen Moseley and briefed him on the plan well before the order was emailed to his headquarters on 20 February. Unfortunately, evidence indicates that commander-to-commander integration only occurred after the

> plan was briefed to General Franks on 26 February, six days after the plan was finalized.[49]

The trend appears to be that Army senior leaders and their staff might tend to overlook or underestimate the incorporation of the air component into their planning processes, and therefore do not feel compelled to request "support" assets to "officially" attend. Whereas, some aggressive "support" officers, like Colonel Pitman did during Operation Eagle Claw, might be inclined to force their way into JTF planning meetings, it should be the exception and not the norm. So, the question becomes, why do other Services tend to overlook the air component? It is this author's contention that it is rooted consciously or subconsciously in the disparity between the intra-service hierarchies (combat versus support).

In conclusion, Operation Anaconda was ultimately successful at routing the Taliban from the Shahi Kot valley. However, it was not without significant service friction between the Air Force and the Army. Some would argue the friction was rooted in the differences between their service cultures, whereas communication and behaviors shaped inadequate joint coordination through the lens of combat versus support assets. The Services, and more importantly the joint team, would be well served to adopt a model of mutual respect, and recognize that they each have different planning timelines, with varying degrees of complexity, and the best practice might be one of common courtesy.

[49] Davis, 85.

CHAPTER 4

Analysis

Culture is an abstraction, yet the forces that are created in social and organizational situations that derived from culture are powerful. If we don't understand the operation of these forces, we become victim to them.

-- Edgar H. Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*

This chapter will discuss four primary inter-service friction points, or joint obstacles, that are most likely to create operational tension during joint interactions and affect the efficacy of the JFC during the conduct of joint operations. The four broad inter-service friction points are Conflicting Intra-Service Hierarchies Disparity (Combat versus Support), Rank-Responsibility Disparity (Rank versus Responsibility), Obedience Disparity (Disciplined Obedience versus The Thinking Man), and Independence Disparity (Dependent versus Independent).

Conflicting Intra-Service Hierarchies (Combat vs. Support)

Chapter 2 highlighted the various intra-service hierarchies, or tribal subcultures, within the various Services. The Army culture consists of an intra-service hierarchy of infantry, armor, and artillery officers in order. The Army clearly places prestige on their combat arms officers over their support officers. The Navy culture is the most "elaborate in its distinctions among" its intra-service hierarchy, idolizing carrier-aviation, submarine warfare officers, and surface warfare, in order. The Navy considers these tribes as their warfighters or combat arms personnel. The Air Force culture places prestige in its

aviators above all others, and considers their aviators on the "tip of the spear," more in line with combat arms officers than "support" officers. Lastly, the Marine Corps culture appears to be the least affected by tribal subcultures, although its promotions to Commandant indicate favoritism towards career riflemen.

At the risk of overly simplifying the relationships, the Army and Marine Corps cultures favor or value the human with the weapon in his hand, while the Navy and the Air Force cultures favor or value the operator of advanced weapon systems. The systems favored by the Navy and the Air Force would likely be viewed by the Soldier and Marine as "support" platforms, where the Soldier and the Marine are *the* "combat" assets. The intra-service hierarchy disparities between the Services implies that service friction is most likely to occur between Army/Marine combat arms officers and Sailors/Airmen writ large--these two groups are viewed as "support" officers through the eyes of the Soldier, and to a lesser extent, the Marine. The most profound service friction is likely to occur between the "pinnacles" of the Services, especially if one service's pinnacle is another service's polar opposite. Some examples might include the Army infantryman and the Navy surface warfare officer, the Air Force aviator and the Army armor officer, or the Marine rifleman and the Air Force aviator. The JFC must be aware of, and mitigate, the service friction that is likely to occur because of disparate Service perspectives on classifying combat versus support officers, particularly where competing strong egos might fuel tensions.

Rank-Responsibility Disparity (Rank vs. Responsibility)

Chapter 2 discussed in detail the rank-responsibility disparity found in the aviator sub-culture within the Services, which is most influential in the Air Force and Navy. Within the respective Services' aviator sub-cultures, the tribes most likely to exhibit strong rank-responsibility disparities are (in decreasing order), the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and Army. Considering the impact between organizational service cultures, the service culture friction caused from the rank-responsibility disparity is likely to be most prevalent in interactions between Air Force or Navy aviators and Army soldiers or Marine Corps riflemen.

Additionally, the rank-responsibility disparity is likely to cause inter-service friction between enlisted personnel and officers or non-commissioned officers (NCOs) of another Service. Specifically, service cultures that have higher median levels of education in their enlisted corps could cause service friction with the other Service officers who are accustomed to their lesser-educated enlisted personnel of the same rank. For example, according to 2014 education demographics, 62.7% of Air Force enlisted personnel have completed some college, 23.2% have Associate's degrees, and 7.7% have Bachelor's degrees.[50] By comparison, 5% of Army enlisted personnel have Associate's degrees, and 6% have Bachelor's degrees.[51]

Comparative educational demographics for the enlisted corps of the Navy and Marine Corps were not available at the time of this writing. However, the Department of

[50] United States Air Force, "AF Military Demographics," Air Force Personnel Center, http://www.afpc.af.mil/library/airforcepersonneldemographics.asp (accessed December 14, 2014).
[51] United States Army Deputy Chief of Staff, "Army G-1 Demographics," September 30, 2013, U.S. Army, http://www.armyg1.army.mil/hr/demographics.asp (accessed December 14, 2014).

Defense's 2013 Demographics Report provides some insight into the overall education levels of both officer and enlisted active-duty service members. It found that the Air Force had the highest percentage of members with a Bachelor's degree or higher (25.9%), while the Marine Corps had the lowest percentage of members with a Bachelor's degree or higher (11.3%). The Army and Navy were in the middle percentiles with 21.5% and 16.2%, respectively (see table 1).

Table 1. Education Level of U.S. Active Duty Members

Table 1. Education Level of U.S. Active Duty Members

Highest Degree Attained	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force
No High School Diploma or GED	0.3%	0.5%	0.1%	0.0%
High School Diploma/GED or Some College	77.7%	76.8%	87.2%	73.1%
Bachelor's Degree	14.2%	9.8%	9.3%	12.9%
Advanced Degree	7.3%	6.4%	2.0%	13.1%
Combined Bachelor & Advanced Degrees	21.5%	16.2%	11.3%	25.9%
Unknown	0.4%	6.5%	1.4%	0.9%
Total Service Members	528,070	319,838	195,848	326,573

Source: Data adapted from Department of Defense, *2013 Demographics: Profile of the Military Community*, (Washington DC: 2013), table 2.48, 38. Note: AF total for combined degrees does not add up correctly due to rounding errors.

of another Service, where the subordinate is accustomed to more oversight, guidance, and control. The nature of the service members' military specialty also affects this disparity, where specialties that demand highly technical skills and education could cause larger rank-responsibility disparities between the Services. The Operation Eagle Claw discussion in the historical case studies section of this monograph is a good operational example of this rank-responsibility disparity that contributes to service friction.

In summary, because of the high technical nature of the Air Force and Navy missions, and the associated education and technical training that accompanies their missions, the rank-responsibility disparity is most likely to cause service friction between Airmen or Sailors and Soldiers or Marines.

Obedience Disparity (Disciplined Obedience vs. Thinking Man)

At the tactical level, the obedience disparity between the Services is most likely to occur between polar opposite culture types. As discussed in Chapter 2, Dr. Pierce classified the Army's culture as one of "stability and control," as defined by Cameron and Quinn's Organizational Cultural Assessment Instrument (see figure 2). A culture of "stability and control" is reliant upon strict obedience to operate effectively. In contrast, a culture of "flexibility and discretion" is less strict towards obedience expectations, encouraging more of a "thinking man" concept over unwavering obedience. Although a similar cultural assessment to Dr. Pierce's is lacking on the other U.S. Armed Services, it is this author's opinion, based on military and joint experience, that the service culture type of the Air Force is one of "Adhocracy," which favors "flexibility and discretion." The Marine Corps likely falls in the "Clan" culture category, which also has flexibility and discretion leanings, but not as strong as the "Adhocracy" culture. Lastly, the Navy, which is internally focused and rooted in tradition but also focused on independence and technology, likely falls in-between the Clan and Adhocracy cultures.[52]

At the tactical level, the Soldier expects his subordinates to follow orders in a disciplined manner, even if it results in his death; there are times when a few must be sacrificed for the many to guarantee mission success (i.e. capture of the hill), especially

[52] Future researchers should consider conducting cultural studies on the other services similar to Dr. Pierce's service culture study on the U.S. Army. Cultural assessments utilizing the models identified in Cameron and Quinn's *Diagnosing and Changing Organizational Culture: Based on the Competing Values Framework*, could provide the service culture assessments needed to further identify and mitigate service friction caused by disparate service cultures.

when utilizing a direct attack with numerical superiority and overwhelming firepower. The Marine also expects his subordinates to follow orders, but also expects the Marine to be a "thinking man," which is a mindset required for the Corps to defeat a numerically superior enemy, so the Corps does have more flexibility in this regard. The Soldier will perceive the Airman as undisciplined, and the Airman will perceive the Soldier as authoritarian or over-bearing. Some might argue that the Sailor, who demands strict obedience due to "God-like" responsibilities and mission requirements, and the Soldier, have similar expectations for obedience. The Air Force and the Marine Corps have a more flexible view on obedience, if the mission situation permits.

Service friction caused by the obedience disparity is most likely to occur between the Army and the Navy or Air Force, and to a lesser extent, the Marine Corps. A lower level service friction due to an obedience disparity is also likely between the Marine Corps and the Air Force, and to a lesser extent, the Navy.

Independence Disparity (Dependent vs. Independent)

As discussed in Chapter 2, there are two aspects to the independence disparity, both operational and institutional, which could cause service friction. The Navy displays both aspects of this service friction. It is the most operationally independent of the Services, preferring to receive its mission orders and then use its organic sea, air, and land forces to accomplish the mission. It also means that the Navy is the "least joint" of the services and likely to resist more joint integration. It also is firmly secure with its institutional identity as America's first-line defender, projecting power at and from the sea. This independence disparity is likely to cause the most service friction between the Navy and the Army, Air Force, and Marines, in order.

Similar to the Navy, the Army is also firmly confident in its institutional security as a Service. However, the Army is least operationally independent because it is the most dependent on joint integration, largely because it needs the Navy or Air Force for logistics, theater transportation, and support. This operational dependency is likely to cause service friction because of the Army's culture of stability and control, whereas lack of direct control over transportation, logistics, and support would cause friction. This operational dependency is most likely to cause friction between the Army and the Navy or Air Force, both of which are accustomed to operational independence.

While the Navy and Army are firmly secure with their institutional independence, the Air Force is not. The Air Force is the most sensitive of the Services regarding institutionalism, concerned with defending its institutional legitimacy. This is significant because it would likely resist anything perceived as subsuming its authority, especially if it threatens institutional security. Additionally, the Air Force's culture bias towards

flexibility and discretion would also further fuel service friction that comes from perceived micromanagement or overbearing control. The Air Force enjoys largely autonomous operational independence.

Similar to the Air Force, the U.S. Marine Corps is also sensitive to institutional independence. The Corps "institutional paranoia" is on par with the Air Force, if not stronger. However, unlike the Air Force, the Marine Corps lacks operational independence, depending on predominantly the Navy for transportation, logistics, and support.

Collectively, the independence disparity is most likely to cause service friction between the Air Force or Navy and the Army or Marine Corps, especially concerning theater transportation support issues. This disparity is likely magnified because of the inherit cultures of flexibility and discretion found in the Air Force and Navy versus the Army's leanings towards stability and control.

CHAPTER 5

Recommendations & Conclusion

Joint Task Forces (JTFs) now define the way we array our armed forces for war and operations other than war. The effectiveness of joint operations is no longer simply the integration and/or interoperability of two or more military services; it involves the synergistic employment of multi-component forces from multiple services, agencies, and nations. Non-governmental agencies and commercial enterprises must now be routinely combined with traditional military forces to achieve national objectives. Such a dynamic and varied environment demands flexibility, responsiveness, and adaptability not only from the individual Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines, but also from the process which support them.

-- Department of Defense[1]

Joint interactions are a growing business--understanding service culture and mitigating service friction should be a growing commodity.

-- Mark R. Wisher

The previous chapters reviewed several aspects of Service Culture, focusing on how aspects of a Service's culture can cause *service friction* to occur during joint interactions between the U.S. Armed Forces. Chapter 2 highlighted the significant cultural attributes of each of the Services that were most likely to influence service interactions. Chapter 3 highlighted two historical case studies, operations Eagle Claw and Anaconda, where service friction occurred due to disparate cultural attributes of the

[1] Department of Defense, *Strategic Plan for Joint Officer Management and Joint Professional Military Education*, Defense Report (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), 2-3.

Services involved. Chapter 4 highlighted the most significant and most likely service friction points to occur due to disparate service cultures.

The evidence indicates that individual service cultures bias the individual service members. Additionally, service culture influences the thoughts, behaviors, and actions of service members. Senior military leaders are not immune to this influence. Furthermore, the evidence indicates that a lack of understanding and appreciation of the other service cultures also contributes to service friction. Collectively, the evidence in this monograph supports the author's thesis: *a senior military leader's own service culture bias, combined with a lack of understanding and appreciation of fellow sister-service culture, causes service friction that negatively influences the joint team's effectiveness, and therefore the skillful employment of the Joint Force*. In its totality, service friction, unless understood and mitigated, negatively influences service collaboration, coordination, joint staff interactions, command decisions, and ultimately Joint Force employment effectiveness.

Each of the Armed Services has unique roles and responsibilities that play a critical part towards ensuring the collective defense of the United States and protecting U.S. interests abroad. Unique service culture is not necessarily a bad thing--service identity is a strength, but it can also be a weakness in joint operations. The specialization, professionalism, focus, and mindset that comes with each individual Service institution is necessary for success in today's military operations. However, officers of different Services must have the perception that their fellow sister-service officers respect their Service's contributions, understand its limitations, and appreciate its capabilities. Without this mutual respect between the personnel of the differing Services,

it is impossible to develop full trust between them. A shared understanding and appreciation of various Service cultures, capabilities, and limitations, provides the iterative process for mutual respect to occur and endure. Mutual respect paves the way for establishment of joint relationships, and the eventual trust necessary for effective joint combat operations. "Only through better understanding of each other's norms, values and assumptions can real trust and interdependency eventually be forged."[2] The best method to facilitate better understanding among the Services is through joint education and experience. This leads to two primary recommendations: 1) strengthen Joint Acculturation in joint education programs, and 2) increase joint operational assignments for junior officers.

Joint Acculturation

The Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) institutions currently include Joint Acculturation in their curricula, to varying degrees. However, they must do better. The Joint Staff must strengthen the Joint Acculturation academic curricula at all developmental levels within the JPME programs to educate joint officers fully about other service cultures. Specifically, if not already taught, Joint Acculturation should convey the attributes of the unique service cultures, why they exist, identify where and why service-culture friction is likely to occur, and teach certain techniques to mitigate it. The curriculum should identify examples of service-culture friction with the study of historical case studies and recent student experiences. Although important, the

[2] Joint Forces Staff College, *The Joint Staff Officer's Guide*, 4th Ed. (Norfolk VA: JFSC-NDU, 2014), xviii.

curriculum should not simply study Service capabilities and limitations, which is traditionally the case today. Instead, it should spend the weight of effort on organizational culture theory and the unique cultural aspects of the Services.

Joint Operational Assignments for Junior Officers

In his book *Victory on the Potomac*, author James R. Locher III highlighted an article by Air Force General David Jones, who was serving as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Jones authored the article in 1982 as he prepared to testify in a congressional hearing whereby he would "break ranks" and make recommendations for changing the Joint Chiefs of Staff system. Jones recommended implementing inter-service exchange tours to season junior officers in joint operations.[3] Unfortunately, Jones' recommendation never materialized.

Academic methods can impart some level of shared understanding towards joint acculturation. However, a significant portion of joint acculturation must occur through joint operational experience. It is unreasonable to expect Joint Force Commanders, who do not understand or appreciate service capabilities and limitations fully, to lead joint forces effectively. The best way to understand a Service's culture, capabilities, and limitations is to witness them firsthand through joint operational experience.

Junior officers should have sister-service operational exposure, not simply time on a joint staff, before being responsible later in their careers for leading a joint task force operation. Waiting until an officer is an O-6 before exposing him/her to joint tactical

[3] James R. Locher, *Victory of the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon* (College Station, TX: Texas A & M University Press, 2002), 38.

operations is not acceptable if operating as a "varsity" joint team is the future expectation. Joint officers exposed to sister-service operations and tactics is the prerequisite for mastering joint forces' execution.

The JCS should modify the Joint Officer Management Program to promote earlier joint operational seasoning for junior officers. The program should place high-potential officers, who are on the leadership track and therefore have a high probability of becoming joint force commanders, in joint or operational exchange tours. These officers would likely come from the highest levels of the intra-service hierarchies, since the Services promote what they value. The joint assignment should be a one- or two-year assignment to operational joint billets that share similarities to the respective service's own core specialties or experience. For example, aviators, infantrymen, riflemen, security police or military police could all serve in the same capacity in another sister-service that shares the same core capabilities. It should also involve the same type of operational units they are most likely to lead during the command of a joint task force. Joint billets should be filled first, followed by "sister-service" billets (purple vs. light purple assignments), and joint-tour credit should be awarded for both. The program should target senior O-3s or junior O-4s, who will then return to their respective Services to resume their normal Service leadership progression. The program should be a volunteer program, but incentivized to encourage participation. The Services could develop mutually beneficial exchange programs based on functional, domain, or leadership areas of expertise. An example of this occurs through the Air Force's current Air Liaison Officer assignment process, where the officer serves an operational tour at an Army Post to provide air support and advice for the Army Division they support.

Likewise, the Army provides Ground Liaison Officers (GLOs) for Air Force Wings to provide similar liaison support for Airmen.

The recommendation to get junior officers joint operational experience earlier in their careers in not a new one. General Jones posited it over three decades ago, and others have recommended it many times since, most recently in Joint Forces Quarterly magazine.[4] Not only is joint experience and education critical to shaping senior leaders capable of efficiently and effectively leading the joint force, it is also imperative for the junior and mid-level officers who must plan and execute the commander's guidance:

> If we truly want to maximize innovation, the [JPME] system must also address the gap in junior officers' understanding of joint capabilities in specific occupational fields. Only then will the bottom-up aspect of joint planning and execution mature. Coupling top-down joint planning with bottom-up plan refinement and execution will better enable the synergy sought from joint warfare…An early education requirement must include all officers. Senior officers command joint employment, and field-grade and mid-grade officers plan campaigns, but it is the junior officers who have to refine and execute jointly.[5]

The requirement and recommendation for junior officer joint operational seasoning has become increasingly clear since the days of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act. The Services have made significant and lasting changes to develop joint qualified officers. However, the evolution should continue--the Services need to take action. It will be a difficult task and require adjustments to conventional officer career paths, but it does not reduce the importance of the initiative. If implemented correctly, the resulting officers who receive robust joint education, training, and experience, integrated early and

[4] Rhonda Keister, et. al., "Joint PME: Closing the Gap for Junior Officers," *Joint Forces Quarterly* 74 (3rd Quarter 2014): 65-71

[5] Ibid., 67-68.

throughout their career, will provide the best joint leadership for the joint team of the future.

Lastly, the author would be remise without making one additional recommendation. Although previous researchers have made noble attempts at examining military or service culture, further research is required. As a start, future researchers should consider pursuing a detailed examination of the Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy cultures utilizing similar research methods as conducted by Dr. James Pierce. Three separate Service reports utilizing Cameron and Quinn's OCAI model could provide a useful foundation for further synthesis and analysis to examine more closely the interactions between the Services.

Conclusion

In September 2012, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, released his vision for the Joint Force in 2020. The Chairman's *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020* predicts a security environment with destructive technologies available to a wider array and disparate range of potential adversaries. The concept stresses the need for new operational concepts to address the security paradox:

> It proposes an approach called *globally integrated operations*. In this concept, Joint Force elements, globally postured, combine quickly with each other and mission partners to integrate capabilities fluidly across domains, echelons, geographic boundaries, and organizational affiliations. While much about this approach remains to be developed, it aims to leverage the distinct advantages our military holds over adversaries so that

> U.S. Joint Forces, in concert with the other elements of national power, keep America immune from coercion.[6]

The Chairman's concept of globally integrated operations is significant in that it requires a joint force that is agile, flexible, modular, responsive, synergistic, discriminate, utilizing a minimal footprint through geographic pre-positioning, and led through the concept of mission command. To achieve this level of joint capability will require a force that knows itself better than it does today. It will require a joint force team established on mutual respect, trust, and strong relationships to garner interoperability. "Interoperability refers to not only materiel but also to doctrine, organization, training, and leader development."[7] Joint leader development will be the key:

> Joint force elements postured around the globe can combine quickly with each other and mission partners to harmonize capabilities fluidly across domains, echelons, geographic boundaries, and organizational affiliations. These networks will form, evolve, dissolve and reform in different arrangements in time and space as required with significantly greater fluidity and flexibility than do current Joint Forces.[8]

The Joint Force Commander of the future will need to be a well-trained joint qualified officer to be successful leading the joint force while executing globally integrated operations. Joint Acculturation, accomplished through a combined effort of service-culture-focused JPME, joint training and exercises, along with early and frequent joint experiences, will help mitigate the service friction caused by disparate service cultures, and ultimately *form a better joint team*.

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[6] Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020," *Defense Innovation Marketplace,* September 10, 2012, http://www.defenseinnovationmarketplace.mil/resources/JV2020_Capstone.pdf (accessed December 20, 2014), iii.
[7] Ibid., 10.
[8] Ibid., 16.

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Lieutenant Colonel Wisher graduated from Eastern Kentucky University, receiving his commission in 1996. He attended Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training in Wichita Falls, Texas and upon graduation was selected to fly the F-16 Fighting Falcon. He is a Command Pilot with nearly 2,000 hours in fighter aircraft.

Colonel Wisher's military schooling includes USAF Squadron Officer School, USAF Air Command and Staff College-correspondence, USAF Legislative Fellowship Program (IDE), USAF Air War College-correspondence, and Joint Advanced Warfighting School - National Defense University-Joint Forces Staff College (SDE). He holds a Bachelor of Science in Aviation from Eastern Kentucky University. He graduated with distinction from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, earning a Master's of Science with a dual specialization in Aviation/Aerospace Management and Aeronautics. Colonel Wisher served as a military legislative fellow for Congressman Steve Buyer (R-IN) on Capitol Hill during the 111th session of Congress.

Colonel Wisher has extensive close air support experience. He completed four F-16 tours in Korea, Idaho, Italy, and Nevada as an F-16 instructor, evaluator, and forward air controller-airborne. As a captain, he served as a Joint Terminal Attack Controller instructor, evaluator, and Air Liaison Officer (ALO) for the 101st Airborne Division and as a Fighter Duty Officer in an Air Support Operations Center. He deployed four times, twice as an ALO and twice as an F-16 Flight Lead, in support of Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM. Colonel Wisher served as the Director of Operations, and later Commander of the 549th Combat Training Squadron, training thousands of aircrew and battlefield airmen during exercise GREEN FLAG, preparing joint and coalition forces for combat deployments.

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